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Preface 
 
 
Ukraine is a country with high agricultural potentials which are still largely 
untapped. Ukraine is increasingly orienting towards the EU. This is illustrated by 
the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA), a draft of which is 
currently under review for ratification. If the agreement is signed trade relations 
between the EU and Ukraine are expected to further intensify, as it would imply 
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, as well as Ukraine adopting EU laws and 
quality and food safety standards. Ukraine, however, also keeps the option open 
to accept the invitation to join the customs union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. If Ukraine joins the customs union, EU's trade opportunities with 
Ukraine might seriously decline. 
 This study looks into Ukraine's general economic and agricultural develop-
ments in the recent past and points out the key challenges for the country's 
agri-food sector development. Next, this report discusses the sector's pro-
spects under the trade scenario of associating with the EU versus with former 
Soviet republics in a Customs Union. Ukraine's choice for one of the two blocs 
will have important consequences for future trade relations with the EU and, 
hence, the Netherlands. 
 This report has been commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
represented by the Dutch agricultural counsellor in Kiev, Evert Jan Krajenbrink, 
and by Pieter Vaandrager, policy officer in The Hague's headquarters. The authors 
very much appreciated their guidance, kind support and useful feedback during 
the project. Talks with business people, representatives from international and 
Ukrainian organisations have given useful insights into interpreting and evaluating 
literature and data. Their support is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
Laan van Staalduinen 
Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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Summary 
 
 
S.1 Important outcomes 
 
A DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine would help accelerate institutional 
improvements that are needed in Ukraine to better use the agri-food sector's 
potential. An improved business environment would support Dutch companies to 
explore the many opportunities offered by the present state and development 
potential of Ukraine's agri-food supply chain. 
 
Ukraine is increasingly orienting towards the EU. A deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement between the two is currently under review for ratification. 
If the agreement is signed, trade between the EU and Ukraine is expected to in-
tensify, to the benefit of both, yet in particular to Ukraine as the country will 
have improved access to the EU and to third countries' markets as a conse-
quence of Ukrainian standards being harmonised with those of the EU. The lat-
ter, however, needs persistent efforts in institutional investments. Ukraine's 
agricultural development is highly dependent on further reforms improving the 
overall business environment, on lifting the land market regulatory restrictions, 
on aligning food safety and quality standards with international standards, on 
improving access to credits, on increasing labour skills and knowledge. If these 
reforms and investments in institutional improvements are not implied, Dutch 
agri-food trade and investment relations with Ukraine are expected to show little 
dynamics. 
 
 
S.2 Complementary outcomes 
 
- Ukraine is a net exporter of agricultural products, mainly of cereals, vegetable 
oils, oilseeds and dairy products, while importing meat, fruit and vegetables. 
- The EU is Ukraine's major trading partner; Russia is second. Agri-food trade 
has grown between Ukraine and the EU; the trade balance is positive for the 
EU. 
- In Dutch exports to Ukraine (€250m) cocoa paste/butter and cut flow-
ers/other live plants dominate. Rapeseeds and sunflower seeds oil are major 
Dutch imports from Ukraine (total imports: €325m). 
 9 
- Average yields of Ukraine's major crops are low compared to EU averages; 
cow milk yields are increasing but total milk production continues to decline, 
while pork and poultry meat production is expanding. Quality and productivi-
ty-increasing investments are needed to improve the sector's performance 
and competitiveness. 
- The global crisis has had a significant impact on Ukraine's economy in re-
cent years. Growth prospects for 2013 are very modest. For the medium 
term, economic growth may resume, but this is highly dependent on policy 
and institutional reforms, and the global economic recovery. 
- The DCFTA with the EU implies (the need for) food supply chain investments 
in order to improve efficiency and quality, by complying with EU food safety 
standards. Next to (short-term) costs this will result in significant benefits as 
it will open up markets in and beyond the EU. 
- Joining the CU with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBK) could be a strate-
gic decision securing cheap energy imports from Russia. However, the CU 
market for Ukraine's agricultural products is much smaller than the EU and 
would offer little opportunities in markets beyond the EU as institutional re-
forms to improve competitiveness would fail to occur. 
- Ukraine could benefit from a combination of DCFTA with the EU and a free 
trade agreement with RBK CU since it reduces trade barriers with both blocs; 
trade and welfare impacts depend on the specifications of such a scenario. 
- The Dutch government, business community and knowledge organisations 
could provide valuable assistance to Ukraine's efforts to improve its institu-
tional business environment. Such assistance would benefit the Dutch agri-
business too, as it improves the business investment climate that would 
encourage Dutch companies to explore the many opportunities offered by the 
present state and development potential of Ukraine's agri-food supply chain. 
- A DCFTA reduces import tariffs in bilateral trade. As a result more exports of 
cereals and oilseeds from Ukraine to the EU are expected, to the benefit of 
the Dutch livestock and bioenergy producing sector. 
- In case of a DCFTA EU meat import tariffs will decline significantly, which 
leads to more competition with Ukraine meat suppliers only when they can 
offer quality that is demanded in the EU and the Netherlands. Dutch produc-
ers and exporters should withstand Ukraine's competition in the meat sector 
by offering quality produce. 
- In case of a DCFTA, Dutch export opportunities in Ukraine increase for all its 
traditional export products (e.g. dairy, potatoes, horticultural products), in-
put supplies and services including knowledge transfers. However, the use 
of these will be highly dependent on Ukraine resuming economic growth and 
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the speed of institutional improvements that are key for improving the cur-
rent business environment. 
 
 
S.3 Methodology 
 
This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The study is 
based on a broad-ranging literature review and made use of several databases 
from both Ukraine statistical sources and from international organisations. Talks 
with Dutch business people, and oral information provided by representatives 
from international and Ukraine organisations were used to add to and qualify 
own analyses and conclusions.  
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Samenvatting 
 
 
S.1 Belangrijkste uitkomsten 
 
Een DCFTA tussen de EU en Oekraïne zou helpen bij het versnellen van de 
institutionele verbeteringen die in Oekraïne nodig zijn om het potentieel van zijn 
landbouwsector beter te benutten. Een beter ondernemingsklimaat zou 
Nederlandse bedrijven stimuleren om niet alleen de vele mogelijkheden van de 
huidige situatie, maar ook het ontwikkelingspotentieel van de 
landbouwvoedselketen te onderzoeken.  
 
Oekraïne richt zich in steeds grotere mate op de EU. Op dit moment wordt een 
diepe en brede vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen beide beoordeeld ter ratificatie. 
Indien deze overeenkomst wordt ondertekend, zal naar verwachting de handel 
tussen de EU en Oekraïne toenemen. Beide zullen daarvan profiteren, maar met 
name Oekraïne, omdat dit land als gevolg van het harmoniseren van de Oekra-
iense normen met die van de EU makkelijker toegang zal krijgen tot de EU en 
tot de markten van derde landen. De EU zal echter aanhoudende inspanningen 
moeten leveren op het gebied van institutionele investeringen. De ontwikkeling 
van de Oekraïense landbouwsector is in hoge mate afhankelijk van verdere her-
vormingen die het algemene ondernemingsklimaat verbeteren, van het opheffen 
van reglementaire beperkingen met betrekking tot de grondmarkt, van het af-
stemmen van de normen voor voedselveiligheid en -kwaliteit op internationale 
normen, van een betere toegang tot kredieten en van het verbeteren van vak-
kennis en -kunde. Als deze hervormingen en investeringen in institutionele verbe-
teringen niet worden gerealiseerd, zullen de Nederlandse handel in 
landbouwproducten en investeringsrelaties met Oekraïne naar verwachting 
slechts weinig dynamiek vertonen.  
 
 
S.2 Overige uitkomsten 
 
- Oekraïne is netto-exporteur van landbouwproducten, voornamelijk granen, 
plantaardige oliën, oliezaden en zuivelproducten, en importeert daarentegen 
vlees, fruit en groenten.  
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- De EU is de belangrijkste handelspartner voor Oekraïne; Rusland komt op de 
tweede plaats. De handel in landbouwproducten tussen Oekraïne en de EU is 
gegroeid; de handelsbalans is positief voor de EU.  
- De Nederlandse export naar Oekraïne (€ 250 miljoen) betreft hoofdzakelijk 
cacaopasta/-boter en snijbloemen/overige levende planten. Koolzaad- en 
zonnebloemolie zijn producten die Nederland veel importeert vanuit Oekraïne 
(totale import: € 325 miljoen).  
- De gemiddelde opbrengst van de belangrijkste Oekraïense gewassen is laag 
vergeleken met EU-gemiddelden; de koemelkopbrengst stijgt, maar de totale 
melkproductie blijft afnemen, terwijl de productie van varkens- en pluimvee-
vlees toeneemt. Kwaliteit- en productiviteitsverhogende investeringen zijn 
nodig om de prestaties en het concurrentievermogen van de sector te ver-
beteren.  
- De wereldwijde crisis heeft de afgelopen jaren een aanzienlijke impact gehad 
op de Oekraïense economie. De groeiperspectieven voor 2013 zijn zeer be-
scheiden. Op de middellange termijn kan de economische groei mogelijk 
weer aantrekken, maar dat is in hoge mate afhankelijk van beleids- en institu-
tionele hervormingen en van het wereldwijde economisch herstel.  
- De DCFTA met de EU impliceert (de noodzaak van) investeringen in de voed-
selproductieketen om de efficiency en kwaliteit ervan te verbeteren door te 
voldoen aan Europese voedselveiligheidsnormen. Naast (kortetermijn-)kosten 
zal dit tot aanzienlijke voordelen leiden, omdat markten binnen en buiten de 
EU hierdoor toegankelijk worden.  
- Aansluiting bij de douane-unie met Rusland, Belarus en Kazachstan (RBK) zou 
een strategisch besluit kunnen zijn om goedkope energie-import vanuit Rus-
land veilig te stellen. De markt binnen een douane-unie is voor Oekraïense 
landbouwproducten echter veel kleiner dan de EU en zou weinig mogelijkhe-
den bieden op markten buiten de EU, omdat institutionele hervormingen ter 
verbetering van het concurrentievermogen dan zouden uitblijven.  
- Oekraïne zou kunnen profiteren van een combinatie tussen een DCFTA met de 
EU en een vrijhandelsovereenkomst met RBK CU, aangezien daarmee han-
delsbarrières met beide blokken zouden worden weggenomen; de invloed op 
de handel en het welzijn is echter afhankelijk van de specifieke bepalingen van 
een dergelijk scenario.  
- De Nederlandse regering, het bedrijfsleven en kennisorganisaties zouden een 
waardevolle rol kunnen spelen bij de inspanningen van Oekraïne om zijn institu-
tionele ondernemingsklimaat te verbeteren. Van een dergelijke ondersteuning 
zou ook de Nederlandse landbouwsector kunnen profiteren, omdat dat het 
klimaat voor bedrijfsinvesteringen zou versterken en Nederlandse onderne-
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mingen gestimuleerd zouden worden om de vele mogelijkheden van de huidige 
situatie en het ontwikkelingspotentieel van de Oekraïense landbouwvoedselke-
ten te onderzoeken.  
- Een DCFTA verlaagt de invoerheffingen in de bilaterale handel. Als gevolg 
daarvan wordt een stijging in de export van granen en oliezaden van Oekra-
ine naar de EU verwacht en dat is gunstig voor de Nederlandse veeteelt- en 
bio-energie producerende sector.  
- In geval van een DCFTA zullen de Europese importheffingen voor vlees aan-
zienlijk dalen, wat alleen zal leiden tot meer concurrentie van Oekraïense 
vleesleveranciers als zij de kwaliteit kunnen bieden die in de EU en Neder-
land vereist is. Nederlandse producenten en exporteurs zouden concurrentie 
vanuit Oekraïne in de vleessector het hoofd moeten kunnen bieden door kwa-
liteitsproducten te leveren.  
- In geval van een DCFTA krijgt Nederland meer mogelijkheden om alle traditi-
onele exportproducten (bijv. zuivel, aardappelen, tuinbouwproducten) en de 
daarvoor benodigde inputs en diensten, inclusief kennisoverdracht, naar Oe-
kraïne te exporteren. Of deze mogelijkheden daadwerkelijk worden benut, 
zal echter in hoge mate afhangen van een herstel van de Oekraïense eco-
nomie en de snelheid van institutionele hervormingen die cruciaal zijn voor 
het verbeteren van het huidige bedrijfsmilieu.  
 
 
S.3 Methode 
 
Deze rapportage is opgesteld in opdracht van het ministerie van Economische 
Zaken. Het huidige onderzoek is gebaseerd op een breed opgezet literatuuron-
derzoek en er is gebruikgemaakt van diverse databases van Oekraïense statis-
tische bronnen en internationale organisaties. Gesprekken met Nederlandse 
zakenmensen en mondelinge informatie van vertegenwoordigers van internatio-
nale en Oekraïense organisaties zijn gebruikt om eigen analyses en conclusies 
aan te vullen en te kwalificeren.  
 
 
  
 14 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Dutch agri-food trade relations with Ukraine have grown over the last decade 
and an increased number of companies from both countries have established 
close cooperation and partnerships. In summer 2010, the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation and the Ukrainian Ministry of Agrar-
ian Policy and Food initiated a bilateral working group on agriculture. This group 
identified the greenhouse vegetable sector, the potato and the dairy sector as 
priority sectors in which both governments could enhance further agribusiness 
developments through intensified bilateral cooperation (AgentschapNL, 2012b). 
 Ukraine is increasingly orienting towards the EU, which is illustrated by the 
establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 
between the two. Negotiations started in 2008 and were concluded in a draft 
text on an Association Agreement by mid-2012 which is now in a ratification 
process by EU member states. Such an agreement is likely to imply important 
market access improvements for the Dutch agribusiness. At the same time, an 
FTA may offer Ukraine increasing export possibilities to the EU. However, 
Ukraine is also invited to join the Customs Union (CU) of Russia, Belarus and Ka-
zakhstan. If the country becomes a member of the CU, trade with the EU might 
be expected to decline. 
 The main objective of this study is to provide an overview of the general 
economic and policy context that is important for Ukraine's agricultural devel-
opment. Furthermore, this research provides insights into future prospects on 
Ukraine's agricultural markets, and gives an analysis of major drivers of these 
market developments. In doing so, this report indicates present perspectives 
for sustainable agribusiness relations of Dutch agribusiness in Ukraine, and 
analyses how those opportunities might evolve in the medium term, considering 
general economic and sector specific developments, and the changes in market 
access conditions as result of a close alignment with the EU versus a scenario 
in which Ukraine joins the CU with former Soviet republics. 
 The outline of the report is a follows. Chapter 2 describes Ukraine's general 
economic developments during the last decade, focusing on key indicators as 
GDP growth, inflation, trade relations, foreign investment inflows and the coun-
try's business environment. Next, Chapter 3 presents Ukraine's agri-food sec-
tor, showing major production trends in the sector's major commodities and 
evaluating key features of the sector's structure and performance. This chapter 
concludes with listing key challenges for Ukraine's agri-food sector develop-
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ment. Chapter 4 continues analysing major drivers of agri-food developments in 
Ukraine, referring to general economic growth and consumer demand, to agri-
cultural and policy reforms and the overall economic growth in the country's ma-
jor trading partners. Chapter 5 discusses prospects for developments in the 
context of different trade scenarios between Ukraine and the EU. Conclusions 
on how these prospects affect Dutch agribusiness opportunities are drawn in 
Chapter 6. 
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2 Economic developments, trade and 
foreign investment 
 
 
Key findings 
 
- The country's economic performance in past years has been very volatile: 
the global crisis has had a significant impact on economic growth in 
2008/2009, which has rebounded to positive figures in most recent years, 
yet economic recovery remains vulnerable. 
- Ukraine is a net-importing country, importing energy resources (oil and gas) 
and exporting industrial goods and agricultural products. 
- Ukraine is a net exporter of agricultural products, mainly cereals, vegetable 
oils, oilseeds and dairy products, while importing meat, fruit and vegetables. 
- The EU is Ukraine's major trading partner in agricultural products, Russia is 
second. Agri-food trade has grown between Ukraine and the EU; the trade 
balance is positive for the EU. 
- Dutch agricultural exports to Ukraine (total USD350m or €250m in 2011) 
are mainly cocoa paste/butter and cut flowers/other live plants. Rapeseeds 
and sunflower seeds oil are major imports of the Netherlands from Ukraine 
(total agri-imports USD435m or €325m). 
- EU is the most important source of FDI in Ukraine, with the Netherlands as a 
significant investor (13% of all inflows). 
- Ukraine's score in the World Bank's 'ease of doing business' index is poor, in 
particular in comparison with countries in the region. Registering property, 
the tax system, cross-border trading and dealing with construction permits 
are particularly complicated, time-consuming and costly when doing busi-
ness in Ukraine. 
 
 
2.1 Economic developments 
 
Ukraine is a lower middle income country with an average per capita income of 
almost USD4,000 (or USD7,500 based on purchasing power parity). This aver-
age income is equal to the average income in Albania, and about half the aver-
age income in Romania or Bulgaria. Compared with other former Soviet 
republics, Ukraine's average income per capita is slightly higher than in neigh-
 17 
bouring countries Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, yet significantly lower than in 
Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. Yet, with a grey economy that is estimated at 
35% to 50% of the country's GDP (Kyiv Post, 2012) the purchasing power of 
Ukraine's population is significantly higher than official figures suggest. 
 Before its independence in 1991, Ukraine was the most important economic 
component of the former Soviet Union after Russia, producing about four times 
the output of the next-ranking republic. Its fertile black soil generated more than 
one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output, and its farms provided substantial quan-
tities of meat, milk, grain and vegetables to other republics (Matabadal, 2013). 
In the years following independence, the country's GDP fell to less than 40% of 
its 1991 level by 1999. In the early 2000s the economy showed strong export-
based growth, mainly due to a recovery of its industrial sector and benefitting 
from global economic upturn. Also agriculture recovered from huge contrac-
tions in production levels in the crop and (especially) the livestock sector in the 
1990s, although it took until the mid-2000s before production levels of major 
crops resumed their pre-independence levels, while dairy and meat production 
are still far below levels achieved before 1991. 
 The country's economic performance in past years has been very volatile. 
Ukraine's economic activity contracted by 14.8% in 2009, as it was heavily af-
fected by the global financial crisis (see Figure 1, indicating that Ukraine's GDP 
decline has been much more extreme than in other neighbouring economies). Be-
sides the fall in gross fixed investments and private consumption, steel prices fell 
markedly and external demand for the country's exports waned. While the econo-
my has rebounded in the following years, it is estimated to have only grown by 
0.5% in 2012. The main reason is falling external demand for the country's steel 
and grain exports but domestic demand also slowed (Matabadal, 2013). 
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Figure 1 GDP, constant prices (% change) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012b). 
 
 According to Matabadal (2013), the government finances of Ukraine are in 
bad shape. Fiscal flexibility is limited; expenditure on wages and social benefits 
absorbs more than 70% of general government spending. The budget deficit 
recorded 3.5% of GDP in 2012 and is estimated at 3.3% of GDP in 2013. Ac-
cording to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2012a), the energy sector re-
mains the drain to the national budget. The government has set energy 
independence as a longer term national objective. Key elements of their strate-
gy to achieve this are investment in domestic gas exploration and production, 
energy efficiency measures, and, if necessary, domestic tariff increases.1 
 Inflation is expected to reaccelerate as food costs are growing again as re-
cent consumer spending exceeds domestic supply considerably. To secure the 
domestic food supply and stem rising domestic prices, the government banned 
wheat exports in October 2012. The monetary policy of the National bank of 
                                                 
1 The Ukrainian authorities have failed to increase gas tariffs paid by households, leading to a contin-
ued large energy sector deficit. While import prices for gas are above USD400 per 1,000 m3, the tar-
iffs paid by households are below USD120 and below USD60 for heating per 1,000 m3, respectively 
(IMF, 2012a. Ukraine: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation. International Monetary Fund, 
p. 96. The issue of raising gas tariffs for domestic consumers is among the key elements in the talks 
between Ukraine and the IMF, to which Ukraine must repay USD5.7bn in 2013. The government has 
also other repayments due in 2013 that feature the government's difficult financial position. In addi-
tion, Gazprom, the Russian gas and oil company, is demanding USD7bn for Ukraine's failure to take 
contracted volumes of the fuel in 2012 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/ukraine-kicks-
off-imf-loan-push-as-reserves-dip-below-key-level.html). 
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Ukraine (NBU) is weak, as it has not been able to control the very volatile infla-
tion in the country. Inflation is expected to average 7.9% in 2013, markedly 
higher than the 0.8% estimated for 2012, and rebounding to levels shown in the 
second half of the 2000s (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Inflation, average consumer prices 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012b). 
 
 
2.2 Trade 
 
2.2.1 Ukraine's overall trade position and trade relation with the EU 
 
Ukraine is a net importing country, importing energy resources (oil and gas) and 
exporting industrial goods and agricultural products. The country has a diversi-
fied heavy industry, producing unique equipment such as large diameter pipes 
and vertical drilling apparatus used in other industrial sectors and mining sites. 
A very important sector is the highly cyclical steel industry, since steel and oth-
er non-precious metals are Ukraine's largest export products. Fuel and energy 
are Ukraine's largest import product, since the industrial sector is heavily de-
pendent on imported gas to meet its energy needs (Matabadal, 2013). Figure 3 
presents Ukrainian exports and imports of agri-food products in 2001-2011. 
As shown, Ukrainian exports increased considerably, and more than the in-
crease in imports. With regard to agri-food products, Ukraine takes the position 
of a net exporter. Cereals, vegetable oils, oil seeds and dairy products are the 
main export products for Ukraine. The most important product groups for agri-
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food imports are meat, fish, citrus fruits, bananas, apples and grapes, primary 
palm oil and beverages (primarily alcohols and wine). Concerning agri-food 
products in general, Ukraine's main trading partners for exports are the EU27, 
Russia, Egypt and Turkey, with India and Korea emerging as important buyers of 
Ukrainian products. 
 
Figure 3 Ukraine exports and imports of agri-food products,  
2001-2011, billion USD 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Trade relations with the EU and with the RBK Customs Union 
 
Overall, the EU is Ukraine's largest trading partner, with around 25-30% of ex-
port and 30-35% of imports in recent years, whereas Russia is Ukraine's second 
largest trading partner (Movchan and Giucci, 2011). For the EU27, Ukraine has 
only been a small trading partner. Focusing on trade with third countries (extra-
EU27 trade), Ukraine ranked 19th on the list of major export destinations of EU 
products and 25th on the list of major imports to the EU27 in 2012 (EU DG 
Trade factsheet). Overall, trade with the EU27 has been much more important 
for Ukraine. After Russia, the EU27 was the second most important trade part-
ner of Ukraine in 2012. 
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 Figure 41 presents the average value of EU27-Ukraine trade in 2008-2011. 
As shown, the main EU27 export products to Ukraine were machinery & 
transport equipment, chemicals, and other products. Ukraine mainly exported 
plant products, fuel & mining material and others. In Figure 4, the difference be-
tween the EU27 imports from Ukraine and the EU27 exports from Ukraine indi-
cates the net trade situation of the EU27 with regard to Ukraine (EU27-Ukraine 
trade balance). A positive value refers to the situation where the EU27 is a net 
exporter to Ukraine and a negative value refers to the situation where the EU27 
is a net importer of the respective products from Ukraine. 
 With a positive trade balance, the EU27 is a net exporter of animal products 
and processed food stuff to Ukraine, and with a negative trade balance, the 
EU27 is a net importer of plant products from Ukraine (see Figure 4). Agri-food 
trade in general has grown between the EU27 and Ukraine during the last years. 
Between 2008 and 2011, agri-food exports from Ukraine to the EU27 increased 
from 10% to about 15% of total Ukrainian exports to the EU27. Similarly, EU27 
agri-food exports to Ukraine increased from 5.3% to 9.3% of total EU27 exports 
to Ukraine (not shown). 
 As shown in Figure 5, the EU27 is an important destination for Ukrainian 
agri-food exports, and since 2006 has become more important than the CU 
countries (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan; RBK). Overall, Ukraine exports of 
plant products dominate, with an enormous increase in exports from Ukraine to 
the EU27 during 2001-2011. For Ukrainian exports of food stuff, the CU coun-
tries have however remained more important than the EU27. The same holds 
for exports of animal products; the value of Ukrainian exports of animal prod-
ucts to the EU27 is very small. Figure 6 illustrates the situation for Ukraine im-
ports from CU countries and the EU27, respectively. From 2001 to 2011, 
Ukraine imported much more agri-food products from the EU27 than from CU 
countries. 
 
                                                 
1 HS codes are aggregated as follows: Animal & Animal Products: HS01, 02, 03, 04, 05 and 1501-
1506; Plant products: 06-14 and 1507-1522, 44-49 Wood & Wood Products; Foodstuffs: 16-24: 
Textile and clothing: 50-63 Textiles, 64-67 Footwear/Headgear; Fuel and mining: 25-27; Chemicals: 
28-38 Chemicals & Allied Industries; Machinery & transport equipment: 86-89 Transportation, 84-85 
Machinery/Electrical; Others: 41-43 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, & Furs, 39-40 Plastics/Rubbers, 98-
99 Service, 90-97 Miscellaneous,  68-71 Stone/Glass, 72-83 Metals. 
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Figure 4 EU27 trade with Ukraine, average 2008-2011, billion USD 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
 
 When the Ukraine trade situation is compared with the CU and the EU27, the 
trade data clearly point out the importance of the EU27, both as export destina-
tion for Ukraine exporters and as a provider of imports to the Ukraine market. 
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Figure 5 Ukraine agri-food exports to the CU and EU27, 2001-2011, 
billion USD 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
 
Figure 6 Ukraine agri-food imports from the CU and EU27,  
2001-2011, billion USD 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
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2.2.3 Agri-food trade between the Netherlands and Ukraine 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 give an overview of agri-food trade between the Nether-
lands and Ukraine from 2001 to 2011. 
 
Figure 7 Dutch agri-food exports to Ukraine, 2001-2011, million USD 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
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Figure 8 Dutch agri-food imports from Ukraine, 2001-2011, million USD 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
 
 Overall, the figures show that since 2008 Dutch imports from Ukraine have 
been more important (in terms of trade value) than Dutch exports to Ukraine. Dif-
ferentiating between plant products, animal products and processed food stuff, 
Figure 7 shows an overall upward trend for the three types of exports from the 
Netherlands to Ukraine. Processed food stuff (HS 16-24) clearly dominated. While 
exports of animal products have considerably increased, the increase of Dutch 
exports of plant products was comparatively small; in fact a decrease was ob-
served in 2009 and 2010 but growth resumed in 2011 (see Figure 7). Figure 8 il-
lustrates the development of Dutch imports of the aforementioned product types 
from Ukraine. The Netherlands first and foremost imported plant products (over 
90% of Dutch total agricultural imports), specifically oil seeds. There are no im-
ports of animal products, but the Netherlands has started to import processed 
food stuff, of which the trend is increasing. 
 Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the agri-food products traded (HS 
codes) and shares, using the average 2008-2011 trade data information from 
UNCOMTRADE. The main exports of Ukraine to the Netherlands were plant 
products, specifically oilseeds (rapeseed and sunflower seeds and oil). Ukrainian 
exports of plant products for animal feed (HS2306) are generally important but 
comparatively small from 2008 to 2011, as is the case for maize. However, 
these average figures hide the fact that Dutch imports from Ukraine of these 
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commodities differ from year to year, and therefore its share in Dutch total im-
ports of these commodities. For example, oilseeds from Ukraine had a share of 
8 and 6% in 2008 and 2009, but only 3.5% of all Dutch oilseeds imports in 
2010 and 2011. At the same time, The Netherlands hardly imported maize from 
Ukraine in the period 2007 to 2011 (only an average 3.5m per year - see Table 
1), but in 2012 about 13% of all Dutch imports of maize came from Ukraine (Eu-
rostat trade figures, 2013). With regard to export value and share in total ex-
ports of the product, export of cocoa products (HS1804 & 1803) is most 
important for the Netherlands. However, live plants including cut flowers (HS6) 
are main Dutch products and in value terms such plant exports to Ukraine are 
more important than the exports of cocoa. Note that the Netherlands also ex-
ports meat offal products, including animal fats. 
 
Table 1 Top 5 agri-food products in trade between the Netherlands 
and Ukraine 
Dutch agri-food imports from Ukraine, average 2008-2011 
Most important 
product with regard 
to value 
Value in 
1,000 USD 
% in rela-
tion to to-
tal Dutch 
imports of 
the prod-
uct 
Most important 
product with regard 
to share in Dutch im-
ports of the respec-
tive product 
Value in 
1,000 
USD 
% in re-
lation to 
total 
Dutch 
imports 
of the 
product 
1205 - Rape or colza 
seeds, whether or not 
broken 
228,751 25.6% 1512 - Sunflower-seed, 
safflower or cotton-
seed oil and fractions, 
whether or not refined, 
not chemically modified 
97,040 24.0% 
1512 - Sunflower-
seed, safflower or cot-
ton-seed oil and frac-
tions, whether or not 
refined, but not chem-
ically modified 
97,040 24.0% 1205 - Rape or colza 
seeds, whether or not 
broken 
228,751 25.6% 
1206 - Sunflower 
seeds, whether or not 
broken 
12,213 4.3% 1007 - Grain sorghum 901 1.8% 
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2306 - Oil-cake and 
other solid residues, 
w/n ground or in the 
form of pellets, result-
ing from the extraction 
of vegetable fats or 
oils 
3,998 0.8% 1401 - Vegetable mate-
rials of a kind used 
primarily for plaiting (for 
example, bamboos, rat-
tans, reeds, rushes 
1,294 5.9% 
1005 - Maize (corn) 3,408 0.4% 2102 - Yeasts (active 
or inactive) 
1,293 5.3% 
Dutch agri-food exports to Ukraine, average 2008-2011 
Most important 
product with regard 
to value 
Value in 
1,000 USD 
% in rela-
tion to total 
Dutch ex-
ports of 
the prod-
uct 
Most important 
product with regard 
to share in Dutch ex-
ports of the respec-
tive product 
Value in 
1,000 
USD 
% in rela-
tion to to-
tal Dutch 
exports of 
the prod-
uct 
1804 - Cocoa butter, 
fat and oil 
33,906 2.5% 2205 - Vermouth and 
other wine  
407 8.8% 
0602 - Other live 
plants (including their 
roots), cuttings and 
slips; mushroom 
spawn 
26,184 0.8% 0410 - Edible products 
of animal origin, n.e.s. 
68 10.5% 
1803 - Cocoa paste, 
whether or not defat-
ted 
16,859 3.3% 1803 - Cocoa paste, 
whether or not defatted 
16,859 3.2% 
0603 - Cut flowers 
and flower buds of a 
kind suitable for bou-
quets or for ornamen-
tal purposes, fresh, 
dried, dye 
16,052 0.4% 0209 - Pig fat, free of 
lean meat, and poultry 
fat, not rendered or 
otherwise extracted, 
fresh, chilled, frozen, 
salt 
1,584 2.2% 
1209 - Seeds, fruit 
and spores, 
14,206 1.2% 1804 - Cocoa butter, 
fat and oil 
33,906 2.5% 
0207 - Meat and edi-
ble offal, of the poultry 
of heading 01.05, 
fresh, chilled or frozen 
14,112 0.7% 1207 - Other oil seeds  2,358 2.5% 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
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2.3 Foreign investments 
 
Foreign direct investment provides capital from non-domestic sources that helps 
to invest in modernisation and restructuring of Ukraine's economy. The inflow of 
capital from abroad also brings in up-to-date technology and management input, 
both contributing importantly to increased productivity and efficiency. 
 In the 1990s and in the first half of the 2000s, Ukraine, like most other 
countries in the former USSR, lagged behind Central Europe and Baltic coun-
tries in attracting FDI. This was caused by a lack of sufficient macroeconomic 
stability, a delay in market-oriented reforms and a generally poor business and 
investment climate. The situation started to change after the Orange Revolution 
in 2004 (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012). In 2005, FDI almost doubled due to the 
reselling of Kryvorizhstal to Mittal Steel (Germany) (FDI inflow) and acquisitions 
of Ukrainian banks by EU banks (FDI outflow). In subsequent years, more foreign 
investments came to industry and services, especially financial services in the 
form of acquisitions of Ukrainian banks by foreign financial groups. Fortunately, 
unlike in some other countries, the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 did 
not reverse this positive trend. 
 Figure 9 shows the development of Ukraine FDI inflow and outflow in 2000-
2011. As shown, FDI inflows considerably increased in recent years, while FDI 
outflows remained comparatively stable since 2007. Apparently, foreign inves-
tors earned money by investing in targeted sectors and industries, as profitabil-
ity is the key attractiveness indicator for FDI. 
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Figure 9  Ukraine FDI inflow and outflow, 2000-2011 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTADStat, 2012). 
 
 FDI inflows are most important for financial services and manufacturing, 
making up for almost 60% of the total Ukrainian FDI inflow. Ukrainian FDI inflows 
for primary agriculture amounted to USD814m (1.6% of total Ukraine FDI in-
flows) and Ukrainian FDI inflows for the food processing industry (agri-food 
products including tobacco and beverages) were USD2,066m (about 4% of total 
Ukraine FDI inflows) in 2011 (SSSU, 2012a). An increase of 49% in FDI into pri-
mary agriculture and of 32% into food processing is observed for both FDI in-
flows in the period 2007-2011 (SSSU, 2012, 2008). 
 Overall, the EU is the most important investor for Ukrainian FDI inflow. The 
EU investment stock in Ukraine as of beginning of 2011 amounted to 
USD35.2bn, which accounted for 78.8% of total Ukraine FDI inflow. The three 
major EU countries investing in Ukraine are Cyprus (28.1%), Germany (20.1%) 
and the Netherlands (13.4%). The high share of Cyprus indicates, most likely, 
the substantial role of Russian, Ukrainian and other CIS capital domiciled in this 
country (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012; UCAB, 2012c). The largest share of the 
FDI outflow (85-90% in 2007-2011) are registered under real estate transac-
tions, renting, engineering and provision of services to businessmen (SSSU, 
2012a, 2012, 2008). 
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2.4 Doing business in Ukraine: the investment and business climate 
 
Table 2 presents the 'Ease of Doing Business' Index 2013 for Ukraine and other 
countries that are relevant in the region and can serve as a benchmark for 
comparison. The index is calculated using 2012 data. For further information on 
the methodology see World Bank (World Bank, 2013a). 
 The overall index about the ease of doing business is derived as an aggre-
gate of indicators that cover different aspects relevant in the business environ-
ment, which will be looked at in details further below. 
 Out of 185 economies included in the World Bank Doing Business Survey, 
Ukraine ranks 137 for the overall indicator 'Ease of Doing Business' and thus 
scores rather poorly. According to the World Bank calculations, doing business 
in Ukraine seems to be difficult, in particularly in comparison with other coun-
tries in the region that reach considerably better positions in the ranking. It 
should be mentioned however that the result of Ukraine's indicators of doing 
business 2012 (referring to 2011 data) was worse, with Ukraine ranking 152nd 
worldwide. Still, the regional average value of the 'Ease of Doing Business' Index 
for Eastern Europe and Central Asia was 77, and hence the environment for do-
ing business in Ukraine can generally be considered to be far below average of 
the region. 
 
Table 2 'Ease of Doing Business' Index 2013 - Ukraine and other 
relevant countries 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Ukraine Turkey Romania Poland Russia 
77  137 71 72 55 112 
Source: World Bank (2013a). 
 
 Table 3 presents the different indicators that in aggregation make up for the 
overall 'Ease of Doing Business' Index. For Ukraine, the value of the 'Starting a 
Business' indicator is comparatively low, indicating a friendly environment for 
starting up business (see #1 in Table 3). Similarly, businesses seem to obtain 
credits relatively easily (#5), but note that the value of the 'Getting Credit' indica-
tor shows that Romania and Poland score even better than Ukraine. Looking at 
the components of these two indicators, their low values for Ukraine result from 
rather low costs of official fees and fees for legal or professional services as 
well as from the fact that deposits are not required before business registration. 
In contrast with the relatively favourable conditions for starting business, 
Ukraine scores poorly in other areas reflected by the other indicators. In com-
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parison with the other countries in the region, registering property (#4) and the 
protection of investors (#6) seem to be particularly difficult in Ukraine. Further-
more, Ukraine ranks on one of the last positions for dealing with construction 
permits (#2), whereby the main issues are the official costs as well as the time 
necessary for completing a building. Only with regard to contract enforcement, 
Ukraine scores better than the other countries (#10). 
 
Table 3 Index of Doing Business 2013, Ukraine and other relevant 
countries 
 Components of Index Ukraine Turkey Romania Poland Russia 
1 Starting a Business 50 72 68 124 137 
2 Dealing with Construction 
Permits 
183 142 129 161 62 
3 Getting Electricity 166 68 168 137 4 
4 Registering Property 149 42 72 62 49 
5 Getting Credit 23 83 12 4 114 
6 Protecting Investors 117 70 49 49 50 
7 Paying Taxes 165 80 136 114 56 
8 Trading Across Borders 145 78 72 50 37 
9 Enforcing Contracts 42 40 60 56 0 
10 Resolving Insolvency 157 124 102 37 0 
Source: World Bank (2013a). 
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3 Ukraine's agriculture: structure and 
performance 
 
 
Key findings 
 
- Agriculture plays an important role in the Ukrainian economy. By 2011, the 
sector accounted for over 8% of GDP and 5.5% of employment in Ukraine. 
- Food processing turnover and food consumption (especially of livestock 
products) significantly increased in the years 2000-2008, but stagnated 
since then due to the general economic downturn. 
- Cereals are Ukraine's main crop (15.5m ha) followed by sunflower seeds 
(4.5m ha). For both crops Ukraine is an important exporter. Cereal yields are 
half of the EU's average. For other major crops like potato and vegetables 
(tomato, cucumber) yields are far below the Dutch average, while low energy 
efficiency in greenhouses, lack of storage and modern post-harvest technol-
ogy results in high costs and low quality of production. 
- Although yields per cow increase (to about 50% of the EU average), the 
overall milk production continues to decline, but as consumption fell, the 
country is still a net exporter of dairy products. Pork and poultry production 
have increased due to recent investments in expanding and upgrading the 
sector's production capacity. 
- Overall competitiveness of the sector is weak due to the generally low quali-
ty of the produce. 
- Key challenges for the further development of Ukraine's agri-food sector are 
related to the improvement of the overall business environment, regulatory 
restrictions on land ownership, inconsistent food safety standards (with in-
ternational standards), limited access to credits and poorly qualified labour. 
 
 
3.1 Role of the agri-food sector in the national economy 
 
There is consensus that today Ukraine is one of the potential rising stars of 
Eastern Europe (BE Berlin Economics, 2011; EC, 2009; Leeuwen et al., 2012; 
TEBODIN, 2013a). The sheer size of the country, its key geographical position, 
combined with its fertile soils, are features that contribute to its huge agricultur-
al potential. Untapping the agricultural potential could give an significant boost 
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to the overall economy as the sector still plays an important role in the Ukrainian 
economy. By 2011, it accounted for over 8% of GDP and 5.5% of employment 
in Ukraine. Since 2000, agriculture has been growing at an average of about 
3.2% annually. As other sectors grew faster, the agricultural sector's contribu-
tion to GDP declined for quite a number of years. Since 2008, though, growth in 
agriculture's value added exceeded growth in other sectors, resulting in an in-
creasing share in the country's GDP (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 Value added in agricultural sector as per cent of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank (2013b). 
 
 Agriculture is an important and increasing source of foreign earnings. Most 
recent years indicate the sector's exports (see Figure 3) add to almost 10% of 
the country's total exports. The share of agricultural imports in total imports has 
been at a rather low level throughout the years, yet shows a considerable in-
crease from 1.7% in 2008 to 4.6% in 2011. 
 A major policy goal in Ukraine is to keep domestic food prices low. With al-
most 50% of the Ukrainian population considered to be living below the poverty 
line up to 2006 (substantially diminished to 7.8% in 2011) and as food accounts 
for more than 50% of total Ukrainian household expenditures during the last 
decade (SSSU, 2012, 2008), the social and political cost of elevated food pric-
es is rather high in Ukraine. Even though Ukraine experienced a rapid increase 
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in inflation (see also Figure 2), with the underlying cause being mainly the over-
heating of the Ukrainian economy from 2000 to 2008, average real incomes 
were rising at a faster rate than food prices and thus the average poverty im-
pact of food price inflation has been negligible (Leeuwen et al., 2012). The de-
velopment of average nominal wages and food price indices as presented in 
Figure 11, shows that the increase of wages has been more than twice as fast 
as food price increases in Ukraine.1 
 
Figure 11 Consumer price index for food products and average nominal 
wage index for Ukraine (2003=1) 
 
Source: based on data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU, 2012, 2008). 
 
 
3.2 Food industry and food consumption 
 
Food processing has an annual turnover of USD19.5bn (in 2011), making up 
15% of total industrial output. It generates direct employment for 13% of work-
ing population. Food processing has been less affected by the economic crisis 
than other manufacturing sectors in Ukraine even registering, on average, a 
positive growth of 5% during 2008-2011. 
                                                 
1 However, the World Bank points out that in Ukraine higher agricultural commodity prices have not 
translated into higher agricultural wages in Ukraine's rural areas. Thus, as a larger share of Ukraine's 
rural population is below or close to the poverty line compared to the urban population, the rural pop-
ulation in Ukraine might be more negatively affected by rising food prices (World Bank, 2008). 
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 The Ukraine agro-industrial complex is one of the most attractive sectors for 
investment, despite the difficult operating environment, the absence of a land 
market, legal regulations and dependence on natural conditions (TEBODIN, 
2013a). This attractiveness is primarily due to increasing agricultural product 
prices and relatively low cost of land and labour, as well as the business value 
increase potential in case of legislation change (including the lifting of the mora-
torium on sales of agricultural land). 
 Ukraine's most important food industries are the beverages (soft drinks and 
alcohol-containing drinks), meat, dairy and vegetable oil industry (Figure 9). The 
poultry and dairy industry are rather concentrated, as well as the sugar and con-
fectionary industry. Details on the concentration rates in the other industries are 
not known, but might be expected to be rather fragmented. BMI evaluates the 
fragmented structure is a major weakness of the industry's competitiveness, 
which is due to a lack of good quality of raw materials from the primary agricul-
tural sector and the rudimentary distribution of food (BMI, 2013a). 
 
Table 4 Ukraine's most important food processing industries 
 Share in total food 
processing output 
value, 2012, in % 
Concentration of  
the sub-industry 
Meat and meat products 17.2 Top 20 companies' share is 
almost 10% of cattle livestock, 
almost 27.5% of pig livestock, 
and 57.6% of poultry livestock a) 
Milk and milk products 15.6 quite consolidated (seven major 
players), however it is still far 
below the European numbers a) 
Cereal and starch products 3.6  
Processed fruits and vegetables 5.2  
Vegetable oils and oil products 12.3  
Sugar, confectionary 5.6 70% is controlled by 
8 companies* 
Beverages 21.5 prevailing number of local 
producers and 
moderate concentration a) 
Others 18.9 Unknown 
Total 100  
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (http://ukrstat.gov.ua/); a) from Deloitte (2012). 
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 Ukraine's economic development has been rather successful in the early 
2000s, which may have had a structural effect on the food consumption in the 
country. Indeed, figures show that domestic consumption per capita for live-
stock products increased strongly since early 2000s for meat (pork and espe-
cially for poultry), eggs, fruit and vegetables, and fish (see Table 5). 
Consumption of dairy products showed an upward move in the first part of the 
2000s during the last few years the consumption increase in dairy products has 
stagnated and even decreased after food price surges in 2008. Consumption of 
cheese in recent years is about 4 kg per capita, which is only one sixth of the 
average in the Netherlands and one third of the cheese consumption in Poland 
(Eurostat). In 1998, beef and pork were the most consumed meat types per 
capita (each with about 13.5 kg per capita per year). While beef consumption 
declined almost constantly until 2010 (to 9.8 kg per capita), consumption of 
pork increased to about 18 kg per capita. The most remarkable development 
could be observed in poultry consumption, which increased from 5 kg in 1998 
to about 23.5 kg per capita in 2010. At these levels, poultry consumption in 
Ukraine is similar to that in Poland, where consumers prefer pork over poultry 
(Leeuwen et al., 2012). 
 
Table 5 Consumption of food products in Ukraine in 1990-2011, in kg 
per capita per year 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Meat and meat 
products 
68 39 33 39 51 50 52 51 
Milk and milk 
products 
373 244 199 226 214 212 206 205 
Bread and cereal 
products 
141 128 125 124 115 112 111 110 
Eggs (pieces) 272 171 166 238 260 272 290 310 
Potatoes 131 124 135 136 132 133 129 139 
Vegetables 103 97 102 120 129 137 144 163 
Fruits and berries 47 33 29 37 44 46 48 53 
Fish and fish 
products 
18 4 8 14 18 15 15 13 
Sugar 50 32 37 38 41 38 37 39 
Oil 12 8 9 14 15 15 15 14 
Source: based on data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (http://ukrstat.gov.ua/). 
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 Consumption of cereal products (bread, pasta) are relatively stable in 
Ukraine as these are mature markets, and economic developments (increas-
ing/decreasing income) do not affect the consumption pattern much. Sugar 
consumption has increased, mainly through increasing consumption of pro-
cessed food that contains sweeteners and of confectionary products. The 
canned prepared food market (sausages, bacon/ham, etc.) is declining as con-
sumers develop a preference for ready-made meals. For further historical (and 
forecast) details of food consumption patterns, see Ukraine Food and Drinks 
report (BMI, 2013b). 
 
 
3.3 Regional structure and farming types 
 
3.3.1 Regional structure 
 
Ukraine comprises 25 regions (24 oblasts plus Crimea autonomy republic). The 
agricultural area, comprising 41.6m hectares, which is about 69% of the total 
territory of Ukraine, is distributed quite equally across the country. However, the 
main agricultural regions are located in the Eastern part of Ukraine where land 
productivity is generally higher than the country's average. 7.1% of agricultural 
land is drained, and 5.2% is irrigated. In 2010 Vinnytsya, Dnipropetrovsk, Do-
netsk, Kyiv, Poltava and Cherkasy regions (the darkest in Figure 12) produced 
36% of the gross agricultural production value. Kirovograd (in Central Ukraine) is 
also an important crop-producing region, whereas Lviv (in Western Ukraine) is 
important with regard to livestock production. With only few specific exceptions 
(e.g. poultry production in Crimea), Southern Oblasts (low precipitation) and 
most Northern and Western Oblasts (less suited soils) are less important for 
Ukraine's agricultural production (World Bank, 2008). About 5m ha of non-
utilised agricultural area and additional 1,5m ha of arable land available for use, 
offer large potential for scale increase in agricultural production through area 
expansion (see Table 6). Improvements on the land market (now only long-term 
lease of agricultural land is allowed), and new investments may facilitate such 
area expansion. 
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Figure 12 Gross agricultural production by regions in Ukraine, 2010 
 
Source: Leeuwen et al. (2012). 
 
3.3.2 Land ownership and land reform 
 
In the Soviet Union, most of the land was property of the state, and also in 
Ukraine agricultural land was state-owned and distributed between collective 
farms (kolkozes) and state farms (sovkhozes). The first Law on Peasant Farms 
passed in 1991, enabling the transfer of land from state ownership into the 
ownership of collective agricultural enterprises or other agricultural corpora-
tions. As the land reforms implemented in the 1990s did not bring the expected 
improvements in agricultural productivity, the second stage of land reform in 
Ukraine was launched at the end of 1999 by a Decree of the President. This de-
cree established a rule that land certificates should be converted into land titles 
with physical allocation and land demarcation. Following this requirement, some 
fundamental steps in land reform were made and almost 7m rural residents be-
came owners of physical land plots, with an average land share seize of 4.2 
hectares (Leeuwen et al., 2012) 
 The land reform measures in Ukraine allowed to achieve ownership of agri-
cultural land and its transfer, and thus enabled a farm restructuring process. 
However, since 2001 there is a moratorium on alienation of land shares (pai) 
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imposed in Ukraine. Under the moratorium, the sale, purchase and other forms 
of alienation of most types of agricultural land (as well as changes in 'zoning', 
i.e. designation of use, of agricultural land plots) are prohibited in Ukraine by 
law. The land moratorium was actually imposed for a transitional period (until 
January 1, 2005). However, it was extended several times and in 2007 the 
moratorium expiry term was made dependent on the readiness of the relevant 
regulatory-legal framework (and has at least been extended until the end of 
2012). 
 Regarding the lease of land shares in Ukraine, there were about 17.3m ha of 
rented farmland in Ukraine (under registered contracts for lease of land shares) 
in the first quarter of 2012. The fee for rented land varies across the country, 
with the average rent fee in the first quarter of 2012 being about 443 UAH per 
ha and year. Regarding duration of the lease contracts, the bulk (42.2%) of the 
rent agreements have a duration of 4-5 years, while 5.5% are rented for 1-3 
years, 39.1% for 6-10 years and only about 13.2% for a period longer than 10 
years (State Agency of Land Resources of Ukraine, 2012). According to a Dutch 
farmer operating 14,000 ha in Ukraine (Huizinga, 2013), he changed lease con-
tracts from 5 to 10 years to ensure the commitments of landlords. Renewal of 
land rent contracts is a large administrative burden that his farming business 
has to carry, also in prospects of doubling the existing farming area. 
 Stable rules for both private property and long-term rent of land are general-
ly considered as prerequisites for enhancing agricultural output in Ukraine and 
attracting investments in agriculture. Therefore it seems to be necessary that 
the land market in Ukraine is activated; however, experts state that it is impera-
tive that Ukraine establishes a proper legal framework for regulating the land 
market and an official and functioning land cadastre before the land moratorium 
is lifted (Fellmann and Nekhay, 2012). With the introduction of an operational 
land cadastre in 2012, restrictions on land sales may be lifted soon. Latest in-
formation on the state of play regarding the land market in Ukraine can be ob-
tained e.g. from the websites of the State Agency of Land Resources of Ukraine 
(www.dazru.gov.ua) and the Center for Land Reform Policy in Ukraine 
(www.myland.org.ua). 
 
3.3.3 Farm types and land use 
 
The agricultural sector structure comprises three groups of producers: agricul-
tural enterprises, family farms and individual rural households. There are more 
than 4.3m small households (averaging 1.7 ha of land each) producing food 
primarily for subsistence purposes but managing almost 30% of Ukraine's total 
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agricultural land (Table 6) and generating 48.2% of the country's Gross Agricul-
tural Output (GAO) in 2011. The rest of GAO was generated by 56,807 agricul-
tural enterprises, which are mainly the successors of former collective and state 
farms, and by 42,101 much smaller family farms (accounting for 5% of GAO) 
with an average of 106 ha of arable land each (Table 6). 
 Privately-owned agricultural enterprises (including family farms) play the lead-
ing role in cultivating mainly export-oriented crops (cereals, oil seeds). Rural 
households with generally small plots have been dominating the production of 
the entire range of livestock products (79.7% in raw milk, 43.3% in meat), pota-
to (96.9%), and vegetables (84.3%) (SSSU, 2012b). Given high labour require-
ments in fruits and vegetable production, this sector secures about a quarter of 
rural employment in agriculture. 
 
Table 6 Land use by farm type, 2011 
 Number of 
units 
Agricultural 
land (1,000 ha) 
Arable land 
(1,000 ha) 
Average area of 
arable land (ha) 
Ukraine, Total  41,557.6 32,498.5  
Agricultural 
organisations 
56,133 20,499.3 19,203.0 365 
Family farms 40,965 4,345.9 4,221.9 106 
Rural households 4,359,000 11,638.1 7,556.0 1.7 
Other land users  5,074.3 1,517.6  
Source: based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU, 2012b). 
 
 Official statistics do not separately provide data on a new type of operators 
in agriculture called agroholdings. According to survey data, 85 agroholdings 
together operate more than 6m ha of agricultural land, which is about 14.4% of 
the total agricultural area (Lissitsa, 2010). According to the ranking of Focus 
(Focus, 2012), the top 20 producers in Ukraine are agroholdings with land area 
ranging from 20,000 to 500,000 ha. The strong upcoming of agroholdings of 
this size is in a way remarkable as there are large restrictions on land sales Ac-
cording to the law (Land Code) '…citizens and legal entities may acquire owner-
ship to agricultural land with total area of 100 hectares …' The land market in 
Ukraine is subject to a moratorium on sale. Therefore, agroholdings lease land 
from private persons (see also next section). 
 The strong increase of the number of large agroholdings is explained by a 
number of reasons (Lissitsa, 2010). First, large scale enterprises receive pref-
erential taxation terms. Second, agriculture has attracted investment from non-
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agricultural sources as profitability of crop production has increased in recent 
years, especially in 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 with high cereal and oilseeds 
prices. Next, land rents are relatively low, so in a situation that returns of agri-
cultural production increase, the comparatively low expenses of land accumula-
tion induce increasing scale of production. Moreover, in the expectation that a 
farmland market will be introduced in the nearest future, agroholdings took posi-
tions to be first on the list to become owner of the rented land.1 A last issue 
mentioned to explain the increasing scale of production through agroholdings is 
that size is considered a necessity of reliable supply of the processing industry, 
and provides companies with better access to the financial resources. (Lissitsa, 
2010) states that in the next decade about 150 largest farm operators in 
Ukraine will produce about 40% of wheat, 60% of corn, 55% of sunflower seed, 
85% of sunflower oil, 80% of rapeseed, 40% of total meat output and 20% of 
milk, however without explaining the base for these estimations. 
 
 
3.4 Trends within the crop and livestock sector 
 
3.4.1 Crop sector 
 
 Over half of Ukraine's arable land is composed of the agriculturally rich 
'black soil' (chernozem), which is ideally suited for crop production. In fact, 
about one-third of the worldwide stock of chernozem soil is located in Ukraine 
(von Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2008). Non-surprisingly, Ukraine was traditionally 
considered as being the 'bread basket' of the Soviet Union, producing about 
60% of its maize, 50% of its sugar beet, and more than 40% of its wheat and 
sunflower seed, all this on about only 15% of the total Soviet Union's arable land 
(World Bank, 1995). 
 Cereals (primarily wheat, corn and barley), oilseeds (primarily sunflower, re-
cently also rapeseed and soy bean) and potatoes dominate Ukrainian crop pro-
duction. Wheat, barley and sunflower seeds together cover about 70% of 
Ukraine's total arable land. The sugar beet, fodder crops and fruit and berries 
areas strongly reduced in the last 10 years (Table 7). Grains have been tradi-
tionally the leading crops in Ukraine, occupying more than 50% of all sown area 
                                                 
1 With the introduction of an operational land cadastre in 2012, restrictions on land sales may be lift-
ed soon. Latest information on the state of play regarding the land market in Ukraine can be obtained 
e.g. from the websites of the State Agency of Land Resources of Ukraine (www.dazru.gov.ua) and the 
Center for Land Reform Policy in Ukraine (www.myland.org.ua). 
 
 42 
a decade ago and nowadays. The most impressive expansion is observed in 
oilseeds crops (Table 7), as a result of the high demand for rapeseed in the EU 
(mainly for biodiesel production). 
 
Table 7 Changes in cropping area 1990-2011, Ukraine 
Crops Average crop-
ping area 1990-
1992 (1,000 ha) 
Average crop-
ping area 2009-
2011 (1,000 ha) 
Change 
(%) 
Production in 
2011 (m t) 
Grain and legumi-
nous crops 
14,386 15,550 8.1 56,747 
Sugar beet (factory) 1,554 452 -70.9 18,740 
Sunflower 1,626 4,514 177.6 8,671 
Potatoes 1,555 1,419 -8.7 24,248 
Vegetables open 
ground 
478 470 -1.5 9,833 
Fruits and berries 669 257 -61.6 1,926 
Fodder crops 1,1754 2,578 -78.1 1,896 
Source: based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU, 2012, 2008). 
 
 Yields in Ukraine of the main grains (wheat, barley and corn) have been 
around 2.7 tonnes per hectare in the most recent years, showing a downward 
trend over the last decade (World Bank data). At these levels Ukraine's cereal 
sector is performing at similar level as Turkey, yet yields are slightly less com-
pared to those in Poland (3.2 t/ha) and Romania (3.3 t/ha). Ukraine's yields of 
wheat and barley are about 50% of an EU average, and far below yields in 
France, UK and Germany. For oilseeds (mainly sunflower seeds) yields achieved 
were 1.7-1.9 t/hectare in most recent harvest years (FAS USDA, 2012), which 
is close to yields in Poland and Romania. In recent years the trend in Ukraine's 
sunflower seed yields is upwards. 
 Ukraine traditionally exports cereals and oilseeds. Due to the good harvests 
exports of wheat, barley and maize, the country's exports for the year 
2012/2013 are expected to amount to more than 6m tonnes of wheat, almost 
2m tonnes of barley and 13m tonnes of maize (Tarassevych, 2012a). With 
these volumes the country is an important supplier of cereals at international 
markets. Next, Ukraine is also a significant exporter of oilseeds, mainly sun-
flower oil and meal (3m tonnes in 2011/2012) and rapeseed oil (1m tonnes in 
2011/2012) the latter especially to the EU for biofuel purposes. Ukraine is in-
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creasingly exporting soybeans: in 2011 already 1.1m tonnes and in 2012 1.3m 
tonnes, largely sold to Middle East countries and Italy. 
 With its fertile soil, Ukraine's grain sector is in principle well-positioned to 
consolidate its important position at the world markets for cereals and oilseeds. 
While Ukraine's wheat productivity is much below EU's major producers, the 
country's production costs are estimated to be about 50% lower than those of 
other well-established European cereal exporters. Furthermore, the country's 
geographical position between West-Europe, Middle east and North-Africa guar-
antees low cost of exports to these cereal net-importing regions. At the same 
time, OECD (2012) points at several challenges the sector should tackle to im-
prove its international competitiveness and use its market opportunities. In-
vestments in better quality inputs, modern machinery and better storage 
facilities could enhance current productivity levels importantly, while investments 
in quality improvements would increase the ability to process the commodities 
importantly, and therefore improve the sector's overall competitiveness. 
 Potato is the most significant crop among all vegetable crops cultivated in 
Ukraine; the country is the fifth world producer of potatoes following China, 
Russia, India and USA. According to Vozhegova and Balashova (2012), southern 
regions of Ukraine are more competitive compared to the Northern and Central 
territories in potato cultivation. This is because they already have irrigation sys-
tems and can better cope with changing climate conditions resulting in frequent 
draughts, observed in all territories of Ukraine. Southern regions focus on culti-
vation of early varieties of potatoes, as well as ware potato production for con-
sumption in winter season. Imported seed potatoes are stored, yet with high 
percentage of loss (up to 30%) and the quality of seed material is often degrad-
ed due to potato disease; the sector generally experiences a high level of virus 
pressure. 
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Table 8 Potato and vegetables production in Ukraine (1990-2011) 
  1990 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Potato production total, m t 16.7 19.5 19.5 19.1 19.5 19.7 18.7 24.1 
Potato production by 
households, % 
71.4 98.6 98.4 98.0 98.0 97.2 97.4 97.5 
Yield ware potatoes 
(Dutch), 1000 kg/ha 
45.0 43.1 41.2 44.5 46.3 46.9 45.3 47.0 
Yield starch potatoes 
(Dutch), 1000 kg/ha 
44.0 44.5 37.6 42.0 45.5 45.1 39.5 44.0 
Yield potatoes (Ukraine), 
1000 kg/ha 
11.7 12.8 13.3 13.1 13.9 13.9 13.2 16.8 
Vegetables production, m t 6.7 7.3 8.1 6.8 8 8.3 8.1 9.8 
Vegetables production by 
households, % 
26.9 89.3 87.9 89.6 86.1 86.6 88.1 84.3 
Source: based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU, 2012, 2008) and Binternet of LEI (BINternet, 
2013). 
 
 Potato production has been relatively stable over the last years, with 2011 
showing a very good harvest. Average yields during the last decade amounted 
to 13-14 tonnes/ha, which is substantially lower than in the Netherlands (see 
Table 8), Germany and some other EU countries (DUCATT, 2011), although 
some of the best (commercially-oriented) farms may reach yields over 40 
tonnes/ha. About 97% of potatoes are produced by households, thus resulting 
in easy spread of diseases and low quality. Seed potatoes are not bought but 
the harvest of last year is used for planting. According to DUCATT (2011), 
gradual increase of yields in Ukraine is associated with the introduction of mod-
ern technologies, use of more productive varieties, and systems of irrigation. 
Furthermore, lack of appropriate storage facilities and quality control systems 
lead to discrepancies between Ukraine's and international standards on potato 
quality and food safety. Investments in better seed quality, in warehouses and in 
technical skills is necessary to improve the sector's productivity performances. 
For being able to invest in productivity and quality improvements the sector's 
accessibility to credits has to improve (DUCATT, 2011). 
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Table 9 Production of vegetables in greenhouses and open area, 2000-
2011 
  1990 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Vegetables area total, 
1000 ha 
447 519 464 449 458 456 468 504 
Vegetables, open area         
Vegetables open area, % to 
total  
99.5 99.5 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 
cucumbers, 1000 t 144 586 557 599 606 703 678 770 
tomatoes, 1000 t 1,466 1,020 1,338 1,270 1,357 1,864 1,651 1,933 
cucumbers, 1000 ha 55 61 53 49 48 50 50 55 
tomatoes, 1000 ha 101 106 93 84 80 83 82 85 
cucumbers yield, 100 kg/ha 26 95 106 122 126 140 135 140 
tomatoes yield, 100 kg/ha 145 96 144 151 170 226 200 229 
Vegetables, protected 
area  
        
cucumbers, 1000 t 163 123 131 144 146 180 182 196 
tomatoes, 1000 t 76 107 134 136 141 177 173 179 
cucumbers, ha 1,168 1,285 1,284 1,298 185 1,384 1,389 1,481 
tomatoes, ha 728 1,060 1,008 1,127 1,101 1,212 1,196 1,332 
cucumbers yield, 100 kg/ha 1,393 958 1,023 1,112 1,134 1,299 1,308 1,326 
tomatoes yield, 100 kg/ha 1,045 1,005 1,330 1,205 1,280 1,462 1,450 1,340 
NL cucumbers yield, 
100 kg/ha 
 6,184 6,973 6,969 6,833 6,949 6,551  
NL tomatoes yield, 
100 kg/ha 
40,63 4,727 4,714 4,567 4,563 5,000 4,794 4,794 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU, 2012b), The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS, 2012). 
 
Vegetable production comprises a wide range of products, of which tomatoes, 
cabbages and cucumbers are major types accounting for about 50% of 
Ukraine's total vegetable production volume (UCAB, 2012c). This total vegetable 
production shows an increasing trend over the last decade, from some 7m 
tonnes from 2004 to 2007 to 8-10m tonnes in the years since then (Table 9). 
Overall, yields are generally low, also because production takes place on many 
small plots. Dutch yields for vegetables produced in greenhouses are 3-6 times 
higher than in Ukraine or other main producing countries as seen in Table 9 and 
Van Galen (2010). 
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 In the greenhouse sector, energy consumption constitutes the biggest part 
of production costs. For example, in the Netherlands, this is about 27% of the 
total cost of greenhouse vegetables, in Ukraine where energy efficiency is lower 
than in the Netherlands, it is about 47% (Van Winden, 2013). According to ex-
perts, Ukrainian growers need Dutch energy efficient technology (NCH, 2013). 
Overall, the energy efficiency in agriculture in Ukraine is three times lower than 
the EU average, even for the best scoring regions in energy efficiency, like Za-
porizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson (Gladkiy et al., 2012). Given double in-
crease of gas prices in 2011 (from USD285/1,000m3 to USD575/1,000m3), 
the price of locally produced greenhouse vegetables is higher than that of im-
ported vegetables from Turkey, Spain, Morocco. Russian imports of Ukrainian 
vegetables are expected to continue playing an important role for the coming 
medium term and thus strengthening of the sector competitiveness is on the 
agenda (Kucherenko, 2013). 
 Similar deficiencies are observed in potato and vegetables production. 
There is a shortage of qualified labour, storage facilities and modern production 
and harvesting technologies, while insufficient capacities to implement posthar-
vest handling of products (sorting, packaging etc.) and a lack of laboratories to 
assure up-to-date quality control services reduces the volume and quality of the 
produce marketed (UCAB, 2012c). There is an increasing trend in vegetable 
consumption in Ukraine, especially tomatoes (Wijnands et al., 2012), that might 
further grow with income growth. There is a growing demand for high quality 
vegetables from modern retailer and there is insufficient production to meet this 
demand (Rozendal, 2013). Yet, in order to use these opportunities the sector 
needs access to finance for investments in operational activities and in fixed as-
sets. While the official data (Table 9) estimates the area under glasshouses of 
about 310 ha in 2011, experts estimate the total area of about 8500 ha of 
greenhouses under plastic and glass, and about 6000 ha of tunnels (Tenduis 
and Streljok, 2011). According to the estimates of (UCAB, 2012c), only about 
60 ha of greenhouses in 2011 are modern. The Ukrainian government plea for 
an increase in the area under modern protected agriculture up to 450 ha by 
year 2020 (APK-Inform, 2013). In 2013, about 53 ha of modern greenhouses 
will be built, as voiced by the agriculture Minister Nikolai Prysyazhnyuk 
(Rozendal, 2013). To meet this demand for construction of greenhouses and 
their successful operation, a transfer of knowledge and skills to this growing 
and highly intensive sector is to be followed. During the trade mission of green-
house sector representatives from Ukraine to the Netherlands, Ukrainian com-
panies showed much interest in switching to alternative energy sources for their 
greenhouses (NUSECO, 2012). Emphasis was made on the energy efficiency in 
 47 
the greenhouses, as this question became a burning issue of today's Ukrainian 
greenhouse business, with the constantly growing gas prices.1 Establishing so 
called Centers of Excellence where Dutch know-how is demonstrated, accom-
panied with regular trainings, could be a channel for technology and knowledge 
transfer (see also under Section 3.4.2 and an example of Indo-Dutch collabora-
tion (EZ, 2013). Further details on the horticulture sector perspectives and chal-
lenges can be found in available studies (Tenduis and Streljok, 2011; UCAB, 
2012c). Ongoing activities on for example training in potatoes production and 
post-harvesting, organized through collaborative Dutch projects, are listed in 
Appendix 3. 
 
3.4.2 Livestock sector 
 
The livestock sector underwent significant changes during the economic and po-
litical transition period between 1990 and 2000. Livestock production de-
creased by about one-half to one-third of the total value of agricultural output 
during that decade. The main reason for this decrease was a strong drop in 
demand for animal products, caused by a decline in Ukrainian real per capita in-
come of more than 60% during the transition period (World Bank and OECD, 
2004). The effects of the decline in real per capita income on demand for ani-
mal products were particularly pronounced because animal products have high-
er income elasticity than other food products (World Bank and OECD, 2004). 
 Milk production takes mainly place on small household plots (80%, see Ta-
ble 9). Thus, the supply side is characterised by an underdeveloped infrastruc-
ture for the provision and distribution of milk. It is difficult for households to 
capture economies of scale in production due to a lack of capital and invest-
ments, low productivity and low marketing ratios. In the early 1990s, the milk 
processing capacity in Ukraine amounted to 18m tonnes of milk, but only 
around 6m tonnes of milk have been processed during the last years of the 
2000s, leaving a big part of the processing capacity unused. According to 
Leeuwen et al. (2012) and OECD (2012), there seems to be great export poten-
tial for the Ukrainian dairy sector, however most production facilities of the dairy 
                                                 
1 In this context it is also interesting to point at possible synergy effects of large agricultural compa-
nies investing in greenhouses next to livestock production where conventional energy resources can 
be substituted by biogas UCAB, 2012c. The greegnhouse sector in Ukraine. Association 'Ukrainian 
Agribusiness Club', Kiev, p. 78. Since 80% of milk is produced by households, there could be oppor-
tunities for biogas installations in villages with no gas supply. Successful projects are financed via 
SNV in e.g. Vietnam, resulting in improved energy efficiency and delivering gas for cooking. These 
examples may be applied in Ukraine too. 
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industry are outdated and investments in modern facilities would be needed. 
Apart from this, the key issues to realise the Ukrainian export potential in the 
dairy sector would be higher efficiency and productivity of dairy cows (Table 10) 
and also improved quality of the milk produced. It is observed that lately invest-
ments in more productive dairy cows are taking place. Furthermore, dairy farm-
ers are supported by the government with coupled premium payments for milk 
(Leeuwen et al., 2012). 
 
Table 10 Milk and meat production in Ukraine (1990-2011) 
  1990 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Milk production total, m t 24.5 13.8 13.3 12.3 11.8 11.6 11.3 11.1 
Milk production by house-
holds, % 
23.9 80.4 81.4 82.0 81.9 80.8 79.9 79.6 
Number of dairy cows, 
1,000 heads 
8,528 3,635 3,346 3,096 2,856 2,737 2,631 2,582 
Dairy productivity, kg/cow          
Ukraine 2,874 3,796 3,975 3,973 4,132 4,238 4,295 4,299 
The Netherlands 6,897 8,267 8,429 8,538 8,574 8,542 8,603 8,710 
Meat production total, 
1,000 t 
4,358 1,597 1,723 1,912 1,906 1,917 2,059 2,144 
Meat production by house-
holds, % 
28.9 63.2 57.3  51.9 48.6 46.1 44.9 43.3  
Source: based on (CBS, 2012; SSSU, 2011, 2012, 2008). 
 
 
 To date, the Ukrainian dairy industry is suffering from a permanent deficit of 
raw milk supplied for processing. A shortage of cows, lack of organized live-
stock breeding and bureaucratic barriers have caused dairy prices to surge, the 
head of a leading Ukrainian dairy company Milkiland shared in an interview to the 
Kyiv Post (Kyiv Post, 2011). On average, in 2007-2011 over half of the pro-
duced raw milk did not reach the processors. Literature review presented in 
(Puchko, 2011) signals that the technical efficiency of Ukrainian dairy farms on 
average could be 60% higher than currently achieved, without attracting addi-
tional resources. Puchko also shows the excellence of the Dutch dairy farms 
over Ukrainian ones with regard to all managerial and financial aspects. Farms 
in the Netherlands are more productive with respect to growing feed and milk 
yield per cow is twice the average yield in Ukraine (8,000 kg/cow versus 
4,000 kg/cow; see Table 10). With regard to labour and land use, Dutch dairy 
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farms produce six times more kilograms of milk per hectare of cultivated area 
and almost six times more milk per labour hour. 
 The quality of raw milk is one of the major problems in the Ukrainian dairy 
sector, as signaled by various studies. Regarding the EU as export destination, 
Ukraine faces problems as the domestically produced raw milk and dairy prod-
ucts are of such low quality that even the highest quality milk from Ukraine is not 
exportable to the EU ((OECD, 2012) The issues of raw milk quality and harmoni-
sation of existing Ukrainian milk quality standards with the EU ones are of the 
core priority in Ukraine under the ongoing free trade area establishing negotia-
tion with the EU. In light of strengths and weaknesses of the Ukrainian dairy sec-
tor as presented above and in the literature (Kulyk, 2011; Puchko, 2011; 
TEBODIN, 2013b; UCAB, 2012b), the following opportunities for Dutch business 
are outlined. For Dutch technology providers and input suppliers, opportunities 
exist in delivering technology and equipment for dairy processing (like cheese, 
baby food), packaging and storage. Advisory services can be provided in the 
area of production technology, but also marketing and distribution, both at the 
governmental level and to private businesses. Quality of the produce is high on 
the agenda when addressing adoption of EU standards. Thus, training towards 
quality improvements, assistance in quality tests and overall guidance towards 
product certification would deliver long-term benefits to the sector. Import of 
high quality dairy products (deserts, ice-cream, baby-food) is expected to re-
main stable. Since the lack of qualified personnel is mentioned as one of the key 
threats, organisation of Centers of Excellence, possibly linked to facilities of the 
Dutch farmers already active in Ukraine, with demo fields and trainings to either 
university graduates or to farm specialists, can be a sustainable solution for co-
operation. 
 Ukrainian beef production is mostly based on dual purpose cattle, with milk 
being the determining output. Production fell from 700,000 tonnes by the mid-
2000s to 400,000 tonnes in recent years (FAO). Low yields and semi-
subsistence farming affected beef production in the past. Investments are 
needed to bring a turnaround to improve feeding and management practices 
that should lead to rising slaughter weights. 
 Pork and poultry meat production trends are up, especially since the mid-
2000s, with poultry showing the strongest annual growth. In recent years, at-
tractive prices (the country is a net-importer of pork) and relatively cheap feeds 
has attracted investment from domestic and foreign sources in the pork indus-
try (Tarassevych, 2012a). The Ukrainian poultry industry is now very concen-
trated, with the three biggest producers having a market share of about 75%, 
and about 50% of the Ukrainian domestic poultry production is concentrated in 
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the two biggest companies. The biggest producers are vertically integrated 
companies. In the last years, the big companies invested in building-up signifi-
cant resources for further integration, e.g. into arable land acquisitions to pro-
duce company-owned fodder crops and into bigger production facilities and 
slaughterhouses (Tarassevych, 2012b). These investment will contribute to the 
sector's ability to compete both at domestic and international markets. With re-
gard to the EU market, access depends very much on complying with EU 
standards on food safety and quality. To date, ongoing upgrade of the Ukrainian 
veterinary-sanitary control system together with multiple deficiencies found by 
EU inspections suggest technical ability to export in 2-4 years for pork and 4-9 
years for beef (Tarassevych, 2012a). 
 
 
3.5 Key challenges for Ukraine's agri-food sector 
 
Referring to its fertile land, low labour cost and pre-1991 performances, Ukraine 
is considered to have huge agricultural potential (EC, 2009; Leeuwen et al., 
2012; OECD, 2012). However, the potential has not been used in the last two 
decades because of several severe institutional bottlenecks. Estimates of what 
is achievable indicate that the agri-food sector (primary and processing) oper-
ates far below its capacity and could produce up to five times as much com-
pared to current levels (IFC, 2011). In order to unlock the potential, the sector 
faces major challenges of which a few are emphasised below. 
 
 First, Ukraine's business and investment climate is rated as very poor by 
numerous international comparative research and indices, and the same is the 
dominant feeling of domestic business community (DG for External Policies, 
2012). This poor performance is largely due to weak institutional arrangements 
and a lack of enforcement of laws and regulations (see also Section 2.4). Ac-
cording to IFC (2011), agribusiness is underdeveloped in Ukraine, largely be-
cause of failures in regulatory issues. An over-regulated permit process, 
excessive and ineffective inspections, and overly prescriptive and costly tech-
nical regulations systems are among the main barriers to business development 
in Ukraine. Moreover, government policies (taxes, subsidies) change frequently 
and business continues to respond negatively to such changes as it creates un-
certainty about current and future profitability, the latter being especially im-
portant for encouraging producers to make long-term investments in production 
capacity and quality improvements. According to the survey results polled over 
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a wide variety of sectors across Ukraine (Boyko et al., 2012) the agriculture 
sector perceives policy instability as its priority problem (Figure 13). 
 Second, lack of adequate policies on land ownership pose a serious con-
straint to further sector development. Land ownership is limited and constraint 
by a moratorium on land sales, while land ownership registration is incomplete. 
Hence, there is no efficiently operating land market, while deficiencies in land 
registration limits access to credits as land cannot act as collateral. Access to 
finance is an overall problem and should be improved (Boyko et al., 2012). Ac-
cording to (BE Berlin Economics, 2011), the provision of loans to agriculture in 
Ukraine is low compared with several benchmark countries, despite the very lu-
crative investment opportunities that are available. 
 Next, standards on food safety, health and hygiene play a vital role in the 
present agri-food system. Following the findings of IFC (IFC, 2011), outdated 
food safety regulations, inconsistent with (and in some instances, in breach of) 
international standards, limit the export potential of Ukrainian food products and 
impose additional and unnecessary costs of compliance with Ukrainian state 
regulations in the food sector amounting to 7% of total product costs. 
 Fourth, poor infrastructure and marketing systems inflate agricultural com-
modities' costs. Farmers receive much less than world market prices due to 
export taxes. Certification requirements and other trade procedures are compli-
cated and add costs to trade across borders. Furthermore, there is a serious 
lack of modern equipped storage facilities, putting pressure on producers to 
quickly sell their produce after harvest (Millns, 2010). Lack of pricing according 
to grading does not encourage producers to improve quality of their products 
as quality improving investments are not rewarding. 
Fifth, there is a huge gap between the skills of Ukrainian graduates and the 
needs of Ukrainian employers (BE Berlin Economics, 2011; Boyko et al., 2012). 
According to Executive Opinion Survey 2011 (Boyko et al., 2012), one in five 
employers considers poorly qualified employees a problem for their business; 
6% of executives believe it is the biggest problem. In terms of sectors, food 
processing and agriculture suffer the most difficulties as a result of poorly quali-
fied employees. In these sectors, 29% of (food processing) and 26% of (agricul-
ture) business executives noted that poorly qualified employees hinder the 
operation of their business. According to the Association 'Ukrainian Agribusiness 
Club' (UCAB, 2012d), the importance of training of young professionals of work-
ing specialties for the needs of modern agricultural enterprises is one of the ma-
jor factors, hindering the development of agricultural production. The most 
wanted specialists are agronomist, veterinarian, livestock specialist, machinery 
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operator. Only 6% of agricultural companies need accountants, economists and 
analysts. 
 The above mentioned list of challenges is surely not complete, but covers 
most of the issues mentioned in Figure 13. The main features of the challenges 
listed point at deficiencies in Ukraine's regulatory framework and in the coun-
try's institutional infrastructure, which is underdeveloped compared to what a 
market-driven agricultural system needs. The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD, 2012) points at the difficult transition period Ukraine 
finds itself in, also because the country experienced a significant worsening in 
the external environment (with economic growth slowing down in many coun-
tries). Further reforms are necessary to improve the ease of doing business, to 
enhance competition between firms and build institutions that will increase the 
sector's efficiency and productivity. Transition from a planned to a market 
economy is a long-term process that needs persistent investments in consistent 
reforms, something which is underlined by the experiences of (at least some of) 
the countries in the region that became member of the EU. Yet, these examples 
also point at the importance of being integrated with and connected to other 
economies. Ukraine's future trade policy is therefore of great importance in de-
termining its speed and pathway of institutional reform, which is necessary to 
enhance its international competitive position. In the next chapters the pro-
spects for development of Ukraine's agri-food sector are evaluated in the con-
text of the country's process of further regional integration, whether this is 
(closest) with its western or (closest) with its eastern neighbors. 
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Figure 13 Most problematic factors for business by industry - by the 
share of respondents who picked a factor as a problematic, 
2011 
 
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2011 (Boyko et al., 2012). 
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4 Main drivers of agri-food developments 
in Ukraine 
 
 
Key findings 
 
- Recent economic growth performance has been modest, and short term 
prospects are pessimistic. Growth may resume, but is highly depended on 
policy and institutional reforms, and the global economic recovery. 
- Overall consumer demand for food is depending on economic growth and 
population growth; population is declining and GDP growth will be slow, at 
least in the short term. 
- Modern food retail increases its market share and increasingly determines 
product and process standards. 
- Agricultural support varied over time and has an ad-hoc nature. A much 
more stable agricultural policy environment aiming at productivity and quality 
enhancements would contribute to improvements of the sector's competi-
tiveness. 
- Ukraine is member of the WTO. The EU applies the Generalised System of 
Preferences to imports from Ukraine. EU protection is highest for cereals 
and meat, via tariffs and restrictive tariff rate quota. 
- Present exchange rate policy, now part of an overall macro-economic stabil-
ity policy, is not favourable to exporters. 
- The EU is already an important market for Ukrainian agri-food exports; the 
size of the market offers Ukraine high opportunities to expand if its agri-food 
sector can comply with EU standards. In case of a DCFTA, access to the EU 
market may improve especially for cereals and meat. 
 
 
4.1 Economic growth 
 
The prospects for the Ukrainian agri-food sector are strongly influenced by the 
economic growth rate and the growth rate of consumer demand. In October 
2012, the IMF predicted an annual GDP growth of around 3.5% for the coming 5 
years (2013-2017) (see Table 11 and IMF(2012a). However, early 2013, eco-
nomic forecasts were revised downwards for the short run: Erste Group Bank 
AG, for instance, cut its forecast for Ukraine's 2013 economic growth from 3 to 
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1.5% as steel exports fell and domestic consumption stagnated (Choursina, 
2013). Moreover, this bank expects inflation to reach 14% in 2013, which is far 
above the 2% in 2012 and much more than IMF projected in October 2012. Al-
so other analysts forecast relatively modest and prudent economic growth fig-
ures for 2013, referring among others to the difficult situation the banking 
sector is in, the fiscal deficits and the high interest rates that negatively affect 
investments. Center for Social and Economic Research, for instance, states that 
smooth economic growth in 2013 will hang on two critical assumptions: 1) that 
the IMF stand-by programme that was introduced in July 2010 to help stabilise 
the financial sector will continue, or at least that the Fund will offer some posi-
tive signal, and 2) that the National Bank will finally manage to devalue the hryv-
nia by 5% to 10%, without triggering catastrophic chain reactions. If those 
challenges are accomplished, CASE estimates a gradual revival of growth in 
2013, with 1.4% expansion of GDP (Dubrovskiy and Boyarchuk, 2012). Yet, in 
its April 2013 Outlook, IMF became less positive about Ukraine's growth per-
spectives in the short run, followed by estimates of the EBRD projecting an 
0.2% and 1% GDP growth respectively for 2013. BMI (2013) also downgraded 
its overall economic outlook for the country, from a previous forecast of 1% to 
projecting a minus 0.5% growth for 2013 and an average economic growth not 
reaching an annual 2% growth from 2012 to 2017. 
 Ukraine's economic growth is closely connected to price developments of 
natural resources, mainly mineral deposits such as iron ore and manganese 
ore, and to developments in its heavy industry and the energy sector. Next to 
domestically produced nuclear power and hydroelectricity, Ukraine has to im-
port 80-90% of its oil and natural gas needs, mainly from Russia. Disputes over 
prices have led to several economic conflicts with Russia, which makes the 
country's economic development vulnerable to energy prices set by its neigh-
bor. And Ukraine's main industries, especially its metallurgy and chemical sec-
tor, are very energy-intensive. 
 Following a decade of robust growth, the Ukraine economy slowed down in 
2008 and came to an abrupt halt in 2009. The general economic decline in the 
world and its subsequent fall in the demand for steel, metallurgic and chemical 
products led to a 15% drop in the country's aggregate output. Investments, ex-
port and imports fell drastically, affecting overall output significantly. Also pri-
vate consumption fell sharply already in 2008 due to poor income performance, 
reduced credit supplies, and rising unemployment (OECD, 2012). 
 Economic growth resumed in 2010 to a positive 4% growth; a robust recov-
ery, compared to the relatively low performance in 2009. In 2011 Ukraine rec-
orded 5% economic growth, which however slowed down again in 2012 as a 
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consequence of plummeting demand for Ukraine major export products. 
Ukraine export performance deteriorated in 2009 due to the slow restoration of 
the global economy, while an overvalued exchange rate affected Ukraine's 
competitive position at world markets negatively (see Section 4.5 for explana-
tion of the country's exchange rate policy). 
 The projections for the medium term are highly uncertain, and depend very 
much on government's reform policies that should enhance overall economic ef-
ficiency. In this context it is worth to refer to a 2012 OECD report (OECD, 2012) 
that addresses major bottlenecks for further development and formulates sec-
tor competitiveness strategies to overcome these bottlenecks. Strengths are 
identified in the abundance of the country's natural resources (huge areas of fer-
tile agricultural land and a wide variety of mineral resources), a strategic loca-
tion between Russia and Central and Western Europe, and a well-qualified labour 
force. However, the industry - major part of the economy - is highly energy-
intensive and inefficient, while the country's specialisation in commoditised sec-
tors such as steel and reliance on external demand makes the country highly 
vulnerable to price volatility. Moreover, the country's business environment is 
qualified as poor: corruption, lack of implementation of investment policy legis-
lation and weak contract enforcement discourage foreign investments. OECD's 
major recommendations emphasize the need to remove barriers to investment 
and to adapt and apply a legal and regulatory framework that is attractive to 
both domestic and foreign investors. 
 Turning to agriculture - a sector wherein Ukraine has many opportunities to 
become internationally competitive according to the OECD - the main challenges 
are to enhance the sector's productivity and increase value added production. 
To achieve results, improved access to financial resources, reform of land mar-
ket, and the further development of institutional services, such as credit infor-
mation services, collateral registration, and market information services are 
recommended. Also, quality standards (for milk and for grain) should be raised 
to EU or international benchmarks, which can be improved, among others, with 
better aligning human capital with the sector needs. Specific interventions in-
clude, for example, human capacity building programs in the fields of veterinary 
medicine, feeding efficiency, animal husbandry skills and management. 
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Table 11 Economic outlook for Ukraine: main indicators 
 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013e 2014e 2018e 
GDP (% change) 
growth 
-14.8 4.1 5.2 0.2 0.0 2.8 3.5 
Consumer prices 
(% change) 
15.9 9.4 8.0 0.6 0.5 4.7 5.0 
Note: Estimates for years 2012-2018. 
Source: IMF (2012b), IMF (2013). 
 
 
4.2 Consumer demand and retail development 
 
The population of Ukraine is estimated to be 45.6m, making it the second larg-
est consumer market in Central and Eastern Europe after Russia. Ukraine's 
population is characterised by the increasing number of elderly and a slowly de-
creasing population. Average income was about USD4,000 per capita (IMF, 
2012b) which is below the levels in neighbouring countries Belarus, Russia, Po-
land and Rumania. Note, however, that this is the official number, that will not 
capture the size of the shadow economy which is estimated to be 40-50% 
(Tarassevych, 2012a). Food accounts for around half of household expenditure. 
 Generally, increasing income levels are the driver to changing consumer 
preferences from cereal-based food items to a food basket more filled with 
dairy, meat (pork and poultry meat), fish, fruit and vegetables, and more de-
mand for processed (prepared, pre-packed, convenience) food. These tenden-
cies were noticed in Ukraine, but most dynamics took place in the period 2000-
2008 when income levels grew strongly. Then, with a significant decline in in-
comes food sales per capita stagnated, even fell, until household expenditure 
went up again in the course of 2011. In 2012, per capita food expenditure was 
estimated an almost 8% increase, while the five-year forecast to 2016 is 50% 
(BMI, 2013a). 
 Also during the years 2000-2008 the structure of the food retail sector 
changed tremendously, with modern supermarket formats taking over market 
shares of the tradition outlets as small private shops 'around the corner' and di-
rect sales on open-air markets (Tarassevych, 2012a). The rise of the supermar-
kets in the country - of which several foreign retail chains - is particularly crucial 
for the development of the rest of the food supply chain, as they require timely 
and stable supply of good quality food, complying with international food safety, 
packaging and quality standards. Supermarkets carry a larger product assort-
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ment than traditional groceries and offer their products generally against very 
competitive prices due to benefits of their scale. However, in Ukraine the growth 
of the retail sector is mainly confined to the major cities where supermarkets 
account for an increasing part of all food sales. In the more remote areas, food 
is still largely sold via markets and roadside stands. Yet, supermarket chains 
spread their wings and penetrate the smaller cities too, with investments picking 
up again in 2012 after a few years of being on hold. Experts estimate their cur-
rent market share at 43%, which is expected to grow in future (Tarassevych, 
2012a). This implies that supermarkets determine increasingly the standards 
products have to comply with, and to which the domestic food industry and its 
suppliers (farmers) have to respond in order to maintain their competitive posi-
tion against foreign supply. 
 The sheer scale of Ukraine, its poor transport infrastructure, and an absence 
of experienced third-party logistics operators make the supply chain and distri-
bution problem a key element in the further development of the grocery chains 
and the food retail sector as a whole. 
 
 
4.3 Agricultural policy developments 
 
Ukraine agricultural policy objectives refer to increased food security and en-
hanced efficiency and international competitiveness of the sector, next to a rural 
development programme (OECD, 2011). Ukraine's government applies a variety 
of support measures to its agricultural sector, such as price support, per tonne 
payments, sugar quota, input subsidies, concessional credits and investment 
grants, next to trade policy measures like tariffs and tariff rate quota (OECD, 
2011). In a OECD comparable analysis (based on the producers support esti-
mate methodology) support levels are modest on aggregate, but variable over 
the years (between 5 and 10% of farmers total revenues; in the EU this share 
has been reduced from 30% in 2005 to around 20% in 2010). Also, there are 
significant differences between sectors and the aggregate numbers disguise 
taxation of export sectors (wheat, maize, sunflower seeds) and protection of 
import sectors (sugar, pig meat, poultry and beef are most protected sectors). 
 Agricultural budget over the past years have been subject to budget austeri-
ty provisions and fell by around 20% in real terms in 2010-2012. Moreover, 
Government interventions have been criticised for their ad-hoc nature and their 
negative impacts on farmers revenues as a complex taxing system, post-
harvest regulations and ad-hoc trade restrictions ultimately reduce farm-gate 
prices (Nivievskyi, 2012). Agriculture sector development would benefit from a 
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more stable policy environment, with a focus on productivity and quality enhanc-
ing instruments and less ad-hoc interventions that have a negative effect on the 
sector's export performance. 
 Since 2001, agricultural land in Ukraine is not allowed to be sold or pur-
chased. The non-functioning farm land market is hindering structural change and 
reducing finance and investments, leading to reduced growth and development 
prospects for the agriculture and food sectors. The government has repeatedly 
declared its commitment to lift the moratorium on farmland trade by 2012 
(SALR, 2011), but it is not yet there. 
 
 
4.4 Trade policy developments 
 
On 16 May 2008, Ukraine became a member of the world trade organisation 
(WTO). With membership, Ukraine brought down its tariff regime to the WTO re-
quirements. The tariffs that Ukraine imposes have been complying with the WTO 
bound tariff rates since 2010; for the adjustment to the WTO bound tariffs for 
key agri-food products see Figure 14. In general, the Ukraine's WTO member-
ship, as well as joining the International Convention on Simplification and Har-
monisation of Customs Procedures and the Convention on the Temporary 
Import, can be considered as crucial steps towards the development of a trans-
parent and efficient trade regime in the country, which benefits export-oriented 
and domestic businesses alike. However, according to a OECD review of Ukrain-
ian policies, considerable work remains in order to bring the regulatory base to 
conformity with the WTO commitments (OECD, 2011). In particular, the national 
laws on standards and certification and on the protection of consumer rights 
require amendments in Ukraine, and new technical regulations for a list of prod-
ucts must be developed (see Section 3.5). 
 Following Ukraine WTO membership, Ukraine considerably reduced tariffs on 
its agri-food imports in general, and the applied tariffs imposed on EU27 plant 
and animal products have been small. However, Ukraine has implemented trade 
policy measures beyond tariffs, in particular export restrictions on grains. Ex-
port restrictions are not compatible with the WTO, and Ukraine will thus need to 
address them at the multilateral level of trade agreements. 
With regard to Ukraine's access to the EU27 market, the EU27 has been apply-
ing a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) (unilateral preferential treatment) 
to exports from Ukraine since 1993. In 2010, the GSP utilisation rate reached a 
level of 72% of the eligible products, which are covered as preferential imports 
under the GSP. Preferential imports include machinery and mechanical appli-
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ances, plants, oils, base metals, chemicals and textiles. However, other prod-
ucts such as grain, seeds, fruits and plants products as well as fish have not 
been granted GSP benefits and are restricted by tariffs and quotas. In particu-
lar, the tariff rate quota system the EU applies on grains is likely to be liberal-
ised within the DCFTA, with Ukraine being increasingly granted more duty free 
quota. Similarly, Ukraine is likely to request the opening of the EU27 markets for 
meat products, which the EU has well protected by quotas and tariffs due to the 
EU27 (and Dutch) defensive interest towards meat and meat products. See Ap-
pendix 2 for the detailed information on Ukraine and EU27 tariffs in bilateral 
trade on selected agri-food products. 
 
Figure 14 Ukraine's import tariff rates on key agricultural products before 
and after WTO accession 
 
Source: StatLink (2011). 
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4.5 Real exchange rates and agricultural trade 
 
The sector's position against foreign competition is not only affected by trade 
policy measures like import tariffs and quota, but also by the exchange rate. 
A change in the real value of a currency takes into account not only movements 
in the currency's nominal exchange rate, but also the difference in price inflation 
between the country in question and its trading partners. The real exchange rate 
thereby captures all the main variables that affect the price competitiveness of a 
country's domestically produced tradable goods vis-à-vis foreign products. As 
part of the country's efforts to combat the severe effects of the global econom-
ic and financial crisis, Ukraine's currency the hryvnia devaluated nearly 60% in 
the years 2008-2010. This improved the sector's price competitiveness at in-
ternational markets relative to competitors significantly. However, since 2010 
further depreciations have been modest as part of the government's decisions 
to keep hryvnia exchange rate fixed in a continually effort against speculation to 
further devaluations and to reduce capital outflows. Yet, inflation has been rela-
tively high in 2010 and 2011 (see Table 11) and the country's exchange rate 
policy resulted in an exchange rate that is generally considered overvalued in 
dollar and/or euro terms, implying that Ukraine products are relatively expen-
sive at international markets while imports are cheap. Overall, the recent ex-
change rate policy of the financial authorities in Ukraine did not foster the 
agricultural sector's competitiveness. A transition towards a more flexible ex-
change rate policy seems possible only when policy reforms to reduce the fiscal 
deficit and the trade deficit have been successfully implemented and confidence 
in the banking sector has been restored. 
 
 
4.6 Developments in Ukraine’s trade partners 
 
Ukraine's agricultural prospects also depend on the developments in countries 
that are now of major importance to Ukraine's export performances. 2010 
Trade figures indicate that the EU is Ukraine's most important market for agri-
cultural products, exporting 22% of Ukraine's total agricultural export of 
€10.5bn to the Union (COMTRADE, 2013). Russia is ranked second followed at 
some distance by Egypt and Turkey (Table 12). 
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Table 12 Economic growth prospects in Ukraine's major markets for its 
food products: EU, Russia and several other countries 
Country 
 
Share of 
destination in 
Ukraine's total 
agricultural 
exports (%) 
Annual economic 
growth projected 
by IMF 2012-
2017 (%) 
Market size (in 
million 
inhabitants) 
GDP per capita 
(USD, 2012, 
estimated by 
IMF) 
EU 22 1-1.5 500 35,000 
Russia 18 3.5-4.0 140 13,700 
Egypt 7 2-6 82 3,100 
Turkey 6 3.5-4.5 75 10,450 
Kazakhstan 3 5.5-6.5 16 12,000 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013). 
 
Economic growth in the EU is sluggish, already for several years and IMF pro-
jections (IMF, 2012b) are showing a continuation of slow growth. However, the 
size of EU's market is huge and affluent, making this an interesting sales market 
for Ukraine products, if they can comply with EU's product and process stand-
ards. The Russian market might show more dynamics in the years to come, as 
the Egyptian, Turkish and Kazakhstani market, yet these are all countries with 
much less purchasing power than the EU citizens. 
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5 Prospect for Ukraine agribusiness: 
possible scenarios EU DCFTA or RBK CU 
 
 
Key findings 
 
- DCFTA accelerates the deepening of economic relations between Ukraine 
and the EU. A DCFTA implies investments in the whole food supply chain aim-
ing at improved efficiency, better quality and complying with international 
standards of food safety. Next to (short-term) costs this will result in signifi-
cant benefits as it will open up markets in and beyond the EU. 
- Ukraine's agricultural development opportunities also dependent on policy 
reforms - see Chapter 4 on Drivers. 
- Joining the CU could be strategic choice securing energy imports from Rus-
sia. However, the CU market for Ukraine's agricultural products is much 
smaller than the EU and would offer little opportunities in markets beyond 
the EU as institutional reforms to improve competitiveness would be delayed 
or fail to occur. 
- A free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU is not feasible when 
Ukraine joins the RBK CU, as the EU will not conclude FTA's with non-WTO 
members. 
- Ukraine could benefit from a combination of DCFTA with the EU and a free 
trade agreement with RBK CU since it reduces trade barriers with both 
blocs. It is however, highly uncertain whether current CU members would al-
low the EU preferential access to their market through its agreement with 
Ukraine. 
 
 
5.1 Ukraine’s integration into the international economy 
 
Ukraine is in the process of further regional integration with its neighbours. The 
country is intensifying its relations with the EU, negotiating about an association 
agreement of which a draft text of an agreed (yet not ratified) deep and com-
prehensive free trade agreement is part of. At the same time the country is 
considering the invitation to join the customs union formed by Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan (RBK CU). This chapter is to discuss the two sets of regional in-
tegration in terms of how it will contribute to Ukraine's overall economic growth 
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and prosperity, and more specifically to the competitiveness of the country's 
agri-food sector. 
 
Box 1 Signing the EU-Ukraine DCFTA 
The European Union and Ukraine initialled the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
Agreement (DCFTA) on 19 July 2012. The next step is that EU member states and Ukraine 
sign and ratify the agreement. Whether the DCFTA agreement will be signed and implemented 
is still an open question and depends on the existing political conditions. Sadowski (2012) 
comments that on the one hand, the repression imposed by the government in Kyiv on its 
political opponents (including the detention of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko) 
has provoked criticism from the EU, which refuses to sign the agreement if the government in 
Kyiv continues to violate democratic principles. On the other hand, Russia is increasingly 
active in its efforts to involve Ukraine in the integration projects it has initiated (the Customs 
Union and the Eurasian Economic Community). It should be noted that Moscow has effective 
instruments to exert its will, such as the dependence of the Ukrainian economy on supplies of 
Russian oil and gas and on exports to the Russian market. Besides, Moscow also has political 
instruments at its disposal.  
 Before the agreement comes into effect, it must be signed and then ratified. Some 
member states are pressing the Commission to enable temporary implementation of the 
DCFTA after it has been signed (which is possible within a timeframe of between one and two 
years) but before its ratification (which can take place within three or four years at the 
earliest). However, EU-Ukraine relations are deadlocked now due to the detention of Yulia 
Tymoshenko. If the Ukrainian government continues to violate democratic standards, the 
European Union’s consent to the implementation of the DCFTA will be very unlikely. 
Source: Sadowski (2012). 
 
 
5.2 Scenario 1: Quick ratification of the DCFTA 
 
The idea of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement goes beyond the 
traditional concept of trade liberalisation and, apart from the elimination of tar-
iffs in trade of goods, it also includes the reduction/ removal of non-tariff barri-
ers (regulatory harmonisation of product and process standards), investment 
rules, competition policy alignment, regulation of service provision, a dispute 
settlement mechanism and institutions to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012). 
 The DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine is based on two key elements. First-
ly, it envisages a liberalisation of trade through lifting customs tariffs, import 
quotas and other barriers (legal, technical and procedural) to trade. The agree-
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ment also states that Ukraine will liberalise regulations on investments and ser-
vices. Secondly, Ukraine undertakes to adopt EU laws, norms and standards 
concerning trade under the agreement. The agreement includes a schedule for 
adopting individual EU regulations, including those concerning sanitary and phy-
to-sanitary measures, technical regulations, customs procedures, investment 
law and the rules for operation of foreign companies, competition rules, state 
aid to business entities, principles which regulate the operation of some 
branches of the service sector, including financial services, telecommunication, 
maritime transport, postal services, etc. The agreement also includes a guide-
line on equal conditions for doing business for business entities (important con-
cerning public procurement) and on protection of intellectual property rights and 
geographical indication (see for further details, Appendix 1). 
 
Ratification of the DCFTA would imply: general economic gains, especially 
for Ukraine. 
Model simulations report positive net welfare gains for Ukraine in case of a 
DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012; Movchan and 
Shportyuk, 2011; Nekhay et al., 2011).1 These economic gains are generated 
by improved access to a large market, lower non-tariff barriers, better business 
and investment climate, which will prompt the inflow of investments and tech-
nologies, and improved access to markets of third countries by harmonizing 
Ukrainian standards with the EU's. 
 From the economic point of view, the implementation of the DCFTA agree-
ment will primarily be significant for Ukraine (Movchan and Shportyuk, 2011). 
This is due to the huge disproportion existing between these two markets - the 
EU with 500m consumers and a GDP of €13 trillion, the world's largest market, 
and the Ukrainian market, which is less than one-tenth times the size in terms of 
the number of consumers, and which placed the 54th in the world regarding its 
GDP level. Economic co-operation is much more important for Ukraine than it is 
for the EU. While for Ukraine the EU is the second largest trade partner after 
Russia (in 2010, the EU accounted for 28.6% of the trade), Ukraine is of sec-
ondary importance for the EU (being only the 22nd largest trade partner, with a 
                                                 
1 A study by the Eurasian Development Bank (a regional bank founded by Russia and Kazakhstan to 
promote economic integration) reports a 1.5% GDP loss for Ukraine if it signs the DCFTA EABR, 
2012. Comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic effects of various forms of deep economic 
integration of Ukraine and the member states of the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space (http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/reports/Ukraina_doklad_eng.pdf). Eurasian Develop-
ment Bank, Centre for Integration Studies, Saint Petersburg, p. 44. This outcome is, however, difficult 
to evaluate as the specifications of the economic model applied and assumptions underlying the sce-
narios are not transparently presented. 
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share of 1.1% in trade) The implementation of this agreement, which provides 
for part of the acquis communautaire to be adopted by Ukraine and the liberali-
sation of trade and investment regulations, will not bring any changes into EU 
legislation. The agreement will have an impact not only on the trade co-
operation between Ukraine and the EU, but also on the operation of Ukraine's 
entire internal market (Dreyer, 2012). 
 The estimates published so far, based on the calculations made with com-
putable general equilibrium models, point to a potential increase in cumulative 
welfare gains (producers, consumers, government) for Ukraine in the long term 
at a rate between 4% and 11%. While, in turn, in the case of the EU, this indica-
tor will not exceed 1% (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012; Movchan and Shportyuk, 
2011). The establishment of a DCFTA with the EU would clearly be in the eco-
nomic interest of the country. Ukraine's exporters would have a better access 
to a large and stable market and, at the same time, Ukrainian companies would 
be able to import advanced capital goods at relatively lower prices, thus improv-
ing their competitive position. 
 
DCFTA ratification may have positive effects on the food industry, but negative 
effects for several agrifood commodities. 
There is no comprehensive, nor an unambiguous evaluation yet of the impact of 
the implementation of the DCFTA agreement on individual sectors of the econ-
omy. According to Sadowski (2012), the branches of the Ukrainian economy 
which could benefit from the agreement in the long term include the clothing, 
wood, metallurgical, food (food production) and machine-building industries. In 
turn, the agriculture, service and light manufacturing sectors may face a de-
crease in income, according to this author. However, the evaluations in this con-
text vary. For example, agriculture is mentioned among the sectors which will 
lose (Emerson, 2012), while some simulations indicate that food manufacturers 
could increase their incomes by €393m in Ukraine and €860m in the EU 
(Nekhay et al., 2011). 
 In case of a DCFTA, Movchan (2011) forecasts an additional growth of real 
GDP in Ukraine by 6.2% in the long run. However, long-term economic impact 
will be accompanied by short-term costs as the study shows: about 1% of 
skilled workers and 3.5% of unskilled workers will probably have to find a new 
job due to changes in the economy that are the result of new conditions of 
competition. For business, FTA will mean the creation of new opportunities 
through duty-free access of Ukrainian goods to the largest market in the region 
and improved access to markets of third countries by harmonizing Ukrainian 
standards with the EU's. Business will benefit from an improved internal regula-
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tory climate. Simultaneously, business expenses are likely to be associated with 
adaptation to the new regulatory environment and standards. Increased compe-
tition in the domestic market will have painful consequences for the weakest 
companies, Movchan and Giucci predict (Movchan and Giucci, 2011). 
 A study by Nekhay et al. (2011) provides a model-based quantitative as-
sessment of the potential impacts of a FTA on agricultural commodity markets 
in the EU and Ukraine. In this study results indicate a positive change in agri-
food producers' revenue of €393m in Ukraine and of €860m in the EU. Thus, 
this FTA entails opportunities for the agricultural sectors of both trading part-
ners. However, gains from a FTA are not distributed equally and vary significant-
ly among commodities. The authors show that some agricultural commodities 
(for example wheat in the EU and Ukraine, SMP, WMP, butter in Ukraine, etc.) 
would lose in case a full liberalisation of trade between Ukraine and the EU 
would occur. Depending on the commodity the economic loss can be explained 
by decreases in producer prices (e.g. for wheat and coarse grains) or decreas-
es in the quantity produced (e.g. SMP, WMP and pork). The changes in exports 
of Ukraine to the EU are negative for wheat, coarse grains, butter, SMP, pork 
and poultry; and positive for rice, cheese and beef & veal. At the same time, 
consumers benefit from better quality and more diversified products and ser-
vices against lower prices. The presumption made by this study is that Ukraine's 
standards (on food safety, animal welfare, quality etc.) are harmonised with 
those of the EU, something which needs investments and reforms, as indicted 
by other studies (like those referred to above). 
 
Ratification of the DCFTA would imply: Investments in the agri-food chain to 
comply with EU standards on quality and food safety. 
Ukraine food and agricultural sector needs to apply the trade acquis commu-
nautaire, meaning that EU standards on quality and food safety would apply to 
all food companies and farms. The food processing sector in Ukraine has de-
veloped rapidly (again mainly in the period up until late 2008) but its further de-
velopment is currently impeded by inadequate domestic raw agricultural 
products and limited export possibilities. Only a few food processors comply 
with the EU quality requirements and packaging standards (some in dairy, oth-
ers in meat). 
 Hence, adopting the trade acquis would require major investments in the 
whole agri-food supply chain; at primary and processing level. Also, increased 
competition on the domestic market will result in food chain restructuring. The EU 
could assist with money and technical assistance both in encouraging investments 
in compliance with EU standards as well as with rural development programs to 
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help reallocate factors of production. EU has also indicated its willingness to as-
sist Ukraine with solutions to reduce its energy dependency from Russia. 
 The current draft document of the DCFTA (EU, 2012) does not provide in-
formation about concrete EU support programmes, but enhanced co-operation 
in terms of information exchange, knowledge transfer and financial assistance 
(EU funds) is mentioned. Such co-operation shall particularly focus on small and 
medium enterprises and shall improve on the situation in rural areas. The draft 
DCFTA states that Ukraine will be able to participate in EU programmes under 
the plans for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument as well as EU 
external assistance but specifically mentions the Ukraine obligation of a financial 
contribution to the EU funds made available (possible payable in terms of some 
kind of co-financing) as well as requirement of strict reporting and evaluation 
procedures. It can thus be expected that the EU will provide financial assistance 
to Ukraine in the context of the DCFTA, building upon the experience gained with 
the EU support to help the new member states in Middle and Eastern Europe ad-
just to EU standards. An example of such support provided to restructuring of 
the energy sector in 2013-2016 with the total assistance fund of €45m can be 
found on the website of the European Commission (EC, 2012). 
 
 
5.3 Scenario 2: Ukraine is joining Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
 
Instead of ratifying the agreement with the EU, Ukraine could align with the for-
mer Soviet republics Russian, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBK) and become a full 
member of the Customs Union with these three countries. 
Key elements of the RBK Customs union are: 
- A common Customs Code; the Union was built on 92% of Russian custom 
tariffs, effectively doubling the external average tariff of Kazakhstan (Rus-
sia's recently-approved membership in the WTO will lead to the revision of 
customs duties within the Customs Union). 
- The Customs Union covers trade in goods, leaving aside trade in services 
and the free movement of capital and persons. 
- Standards on sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) conditions on food and agri-
cultural products and technical barriers to trade (TBTs) on goods are based 
on the Soviet system of standards regulation (GOST) using mandatory tech-
nical regulations. Technical regulations are decided at the level of the Cus-
toms Union (where mandatory technical regulations are being harmonised, 
no mutual recognition agreement exists). 
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Joining the CU could have a number of implications discussed below. 
 
CU membership implies: Trade focus on CU members, a 165m consumers' 
market with a common GDP of €1.7 trillion. 
A CU (common border and common import tariffs) with three CIS countries 
would strengthen Ukraine's trade relations, especially with Russia. The Eurasian 
Development Bank Center for Integration studies projects significant positive ef-
fects for all four member states in case Ukraine joins the CU; Ukraine's GDP 
could be 6-7% higher in 2030 than its GDP under the baseline scenario (EABR, 
2012).1 In the agricultural domain both Russian and Ukraine are complementary 
at some (especially livestock products) markets as Russia needs imports of 
dairy and meat products. Belarus, though, is also a net exporter of dairy prod-
ucts and hence a big competitor for Ukraine at the Russian market. Next to 
dairy products Ukraine's major agricultural exports are fresh and processed 
fruits and vegetables, vegetable oils, cocoa (products) and beverages. 
 
CU membership implies: Regulatory convergence with Russia, the dominant 
player in the CU 
Given that RBK does not have a reputation as leading economic reformers (see 
also 'EBRD, 2012), regulatory convergence could result in investment climate 
deterioration (unless all partners converge to best international practices). In-
deed, the CU requests institutional reforms that are in line with what the CU 
members decide upon, which is not necessarily the same as international 
standards; up to now the Russian laws (e.g. on certification procedures, on qual-
ity and product registration) and interpretations of those laws have been taken 
as the CU rule for trade procedures. These procedures may divert significantly 
from international standards; an example is the way Russian authorities grant 
export access to foreign companies, not only the exported product should meet 
Russian standards but also the production site of the exporting company (for 
some examples of trade practice where Russian requirements diverting from in-
ternational standards hamper trade, see Van Berkum and Dvortsin (2011)). 
Next, as a rule Russia's external tariff is taken as CU's external import tariff. 
Russia's external tariffs of agricultural products are generally higher than those 
of Ukraine, implying an increased protection rate with regard to trade with third 
countries. 
 The trade relations with the EU would be negatively affected as trade prefer-
ences will be granted to neighboring countries, namely the members of the CU, 
                                                 
1 See footnote 6.  
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and Ukraine's import tariffs would effectively increase towards Russian levels. 
This also has to be negotiated within the WTO, a possibly costly affair as other 
member countries might request compensation or impose additional duties on 
Ukrainian goods. 
 
Further orientation on RBK could have an impact on the energy market. 
Increased regional integration could lead to lower import prices of oil and gas 
from Russia. However, energy is a highly strategic good, oil and natural gas are 
Russia's major foreign exchange earning commodities and, hence, Russia may not 
be inclined to offer favorable terms on oil and gas deliverances to CU members. 
Yet, if Russia does, the import price reduction may even increase the dependency 
on Russia as a source of energy as it provides dis-incentives to develop domestic 
energy extraction and/or investments in energy-saving techniques. 
 With joining the CU Ukraine aligns with partners which are not fully integrated 
into the global economy. Belarus and Kazakhstan are not a member of the WTO 
and they do not adhere to internationally accepted standards of food quality and 
food safety. Furthermore, Ukraine would increase agricultural protection rates 
against imports from third countries, giving preferential treatment to CU suppliers. 
Advantage is that competition at the CU market might be easier than at the de-
manding, saturated EU food market, and hence requires less structural reforms 
both in the supply chain as well as in policies than would be necessary to fully 
comply with international standards. Yet the latter would imply the Ukrainian agri-
cultural sector would have difficulties to compete at the non-CU market which is of 
much importance to Ukraine's economy and the agricultural sector too. 
 There is a limited number of general studies on the benefits and costs of 
Ukraine's possible membership in the Customs Union. Yet, while the costs and 
benefits of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA have been calculated and are publicly dis-
cussed, similar estimates are lacking concerning the Customs Union (Shumylo-
Tapiola, 2012). As concluded under scenario 1 (in the previous section), a 
deeper integration with the EU will cost Ukraine - both the state and businesses - 
in the short run, as it implies costs of compliance to EU standards, a possible 
closing down of companies in some sectors and job losses). However, it prom-
ises to have clear welfare benefits in five to ten years (Movchan and Shportyuk, 
2011). It may also send a positive signal to foreign investors and create new 
possibilities for Ukrainian goods and services on EU markets through the im-
provement of norms and standards. The Ukrainian economy is supposed to be-
come more transparent and the rules of the game for businesses are likely to 
improve significantly. 
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5.4 Scenario 3: Alternative 'in-between' scenarios 
 
5.4.1 EU-Ukraine bilateral trade agreement while Ukraine joins RBK CU 
 
This scenario combines Ukraine's membership of the CU with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan with a free trade agreement with the EU. Such a trade agree-
ment between Ukraine and the EU is much less ambitious than a DCFTA, and 
would be narrowly focusing on reducing tariffs and/or non-tariff barriers to a lim-
ited degree. Yet, should Ukraine be a member of the CU, a free trade agree-
ment with the EU will be an agreement with the CU, not with Ukraine only. The 
EU, however, does not establish a free trade agreement with a region that in-
cludes non-members of the WTO, which is the case with Belarus and Kazakh-
stan. Therefore, in this context a free trade agreement between Ukraine and the 
EU is not feasible. Trade between the two blocs - EU and CU - could for instance 
be enhanced by further agreements on trade facilitation. In practice this could 
imply agreements on non-tariff measures and investments, reducing certain bot-
tlenecks to trade and investment between the two regional blocks. Supposedly 
that Russia would accept being involved in such a scenario, it may result into 
improved access for the EU to the Russian market, a huge and important mar-
ket for the European Union, while Russian products would be offered improved 
market entry conditions to the EU. However, the assumed (mutual) benefits in 
the trade relations with Ukraine under the DCFTA will not be achieved. 
 
5.4.2 DCFTA between Ukraine and EU, plus a free trade agreement with RBK CU 
 
An alternative scenario has been proposed by premier Yanukovych, which has 
declined all invitations by the Russian leadership and has instead insisted on the 
'3+1' formula of simple free trade between Ukraine and the Customs Union. 
A European choice remains the main declared direction for the country. 
 
This option would imply the following: 
- Due to a simple free trade agreement Ukraine-CU trade will increase be-
cause of reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
- Increased trade may imply structural adjustment in Ukrainian agri-food sec-
tor as increased competition from CU may affect some sectors negatively. 
- EU exports to Ukraine may benefit from improved market access to CU, us-
ing Ukraine as transit country; rules of origin procedures could avoid such 
an effect. 
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 Ukraine-EU DCFTA continues to be implemented (with assumed [short-term] 
costs and [long-term] benefits as indicated under scenario 1) while Ukraine's 
trade relations with CU member states are enhanced. This option would be fea-
sible in the context of WTO membership, without leading Ukraine to have to re-
negotiate WTO commitments. It would offer Ukraine the possibility to remain 
closely connected to the CU countries and benefit from the current trade oppor-
tunities that will be enhanced, while at the same time it will gain from aligning 
with EU standards and the subsequent commercial benefits such an alignment 
may have at EU markets and beyond. There are no studies investigating possi-
ble effects of this scenario. Impacts on trade flows and welfare effects will de-
pend on the specifications of such a scenario, or, in other words, one would 
have to know how comprehensive a 'free' trade agreement between Ukraine and 
the CU members would be. 
 These 'in-between' scenarios are rather wishful by the Ukrainian government. 
Ukraine hopes to create a free trade area (FTA) with both the European Union 
and the Customs Union in 2013 (INTERFAX, 2013) Statement by president 
Yanukovych regarding the willingness of Ukraine to accede to all the provisions 
of the Customs Union, which are not inconsistent with its international obliga-
tions and rules of the World Trade Organization ((UKRINFORM, 2013a) on the 
one hand and the fact that two weeks later the president has vested National 
Security and Defense Council Secretary with the authority to coordinate activi-
ties in the field of Ukraine's European integration (UKRINFORM, 2013b) illus-
trates the country's wish to elaborate a workable 'in-between' option. However, 
political leaders at both side Russia and the EU emphasize that the CU and the 
European Union are mutually exclusive for Ukraine, in an attempt to force 
Ukraine to make a choice for either the 'eastern' or the 'western' Union mem-
bership (Bespalova, 2013) 
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6 Impact of DCFTA on the Dutch trade 
opportunities with Ukraine 
 
 
Key findings 
 
- For both the EU and Ukraine holds that average duties on agricultural im-
ports are not high, and maximum duties significant in only a few product 
categories. Therefore, impacts of import tariff reduction on bilateral trade 
flows are most probably modest. 
- Next to prices EU (and Dutch) imports from Ukraine will be driven by quality 
and other product attributes than prices. To date Ukraine's agrifood sector 
needs further quality improving investments in order to use the opportunities 
that improved market access to the EU offers. 
- In case of a DCFTA Dutch export opportunities in Ukraine increase for all its 
traditional export products (dairy, potatoes, horticultural products), input 
supplies and services including knowledge transfers. Yet, the use of these 
will be highly dependent on Ukraine's resuming economic growth and the 
speed of institutional improvements that are key for improving the current 
business environment. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As said in Chapter 5, a DCFTA implies a regulatory harmonisation, which entails 
much more than only a reduction of import tariffs. Besides that, as bilateral (EU 
and Ukrainian) import tariffs on agricultural products are generally not that high, 
main effects on trade will occur because of a reduction of non-tariff trade barri-
ers. This chapter summarises the main effects for the Dutch agribusiness from 
the two perspectives: an improved market access for Ukraine to the EU and for 
the EU to Ukraine. 
 
 
6.2 Dutch defensive interests 
 
A DCFTA will (eventually) imply an abolishment of all EU import tariffs on agricul-
tural and food products. Currently Ukraine's exports to the EU are already liber-
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alised to a large extent thanks to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 
which the EU granted to Ukraine in 1993. In agriculture, preferential imports un-
der the GSP include for instance plants and vegetable oils. Furthermore, about a 
quarter of all agricultural products can be sold duty-free by Ukraine exporters on 
the EU market as part of the most favoured nation (MFN) clause, since in 2008 
Ukraine became member of the WTO. Ukraine's agricultural exports to the EU 
(and to the Netherlands) are not significant: around USD450m (€325m) in 2008 
and 2011, and much less in 2009 and 2010 (see Chapter 2), in which oilseeds 
dominate - in some years Ukraine supplies 20-25% of Dutch imports on rape-
seed and of sunflower seed. Apparently current trade conditions imply that 
Dutch imports from Ukraine trade relations are little except for specific types of 
oilseeds. 
 The question is how this will change if tariffs are being reduced or eliminated 
under the DCFTA. Table 13 shows EU's 2012 average ad valorem import tariffs 
(as % of the export value) of agricultural products (on a 2 digit level for HS01-
24); these are the tariffs Ukraine's agricultural exports face when entering the 
EU. Although some specific tariff lines (most detailed at the 8-digit level - see for 
additional information Appendix 2) may be quite high, generally the average EU 
applied import tariff is relatively low, with the highest protection registered for 
the milling industry products (HS11), preparations of meat (HS16) and vegetable 
and fruits (HS 20), and tobacco (HS24) (see Table 13). 
 The Netherlands may have a defensive interest in the product categories 
with the highest tariff protection, such as meat preparations and preparations of 
vegetables and fruits, or tobacco. A reduction of import tariffs for these catego-
ries to eventually zero could imply that imports from Ukraine increase signifi-
cantly because they become more price competitive. Current imports of these 
products from Ukraine have a particular low share in total Dutch (and EU) im-
ports of these products. However, other factors than prices are also important 
in international competition, such as quality and taste. Key is to what extent 
Ukraine's exporters would be able offering the quality levels (standards) re-
quested in the Netherlands and/or the EU to become really a competitor of the 
Dutch agrifood sector on its main markets. To date, Ukraine's agri-food sector 
is not ready to outperform competitors on quality. 
 As reported in Chapter 3, key weaknesses of Ukraine's agricultural sector 
are its low productivity and poor quality of the raw material produced. There-
fore, the sector is in need of further investments. In order to attract investors - 
domestic and foreign - institutional and economic reforms are necessary to im-
prove the overall business environment. However, such reforms are highly un-
likely in the short term given the political and economic outlook in early 2013. 
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Reform of agricultural land ownership remains incomplete, with an effective 
moratorium on land sales in effect until some political compromise is achieved. 
On a positive note, the government is beginning to aim for higher FDI involve-
ment in agriculture and other industries, recently lowering corporate taxes (BMI, 
2013a). A perspective of a signing of a DCFTA will increase the pressure for in-
stitutional reforms. Yet, effects of such reforms will not occur overnight, mean-
ing that Ukraine's use of promising market opportunities that a DCFTA might 
offer its agricultural sector will take quite a while to be realised. 
 
Table 13 EU and Ukraine most-favoured nations import tariffs on 
agricultural products 
  EU MFN applied tariffs a), b) Ukraine - MFN applied tariffs a), b) 
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01 Live ani-
mals 
65 33 1.2 0 11.5 55.6 64 64 4.1 0 15 37.1 
02 Meat 248 62 5.1 0 15.4 19.1 231 231 13.1 5 20 0.0 
04 Dairy 
products 
172 11 5.8 0 17.3 5.7 170 170 10.5 5 20 0.0 
05 Products 
of animal 
origin, etc. 
20 20 0.1 0 5.1 98.3 22 22 14.0 0 20 20.0 
06 Live 
trees and 
other plants 
55 55 7.1 0 12 13.3 48 48 8.0 5 20 0.0 
07 Vegeta-
bles 
122 94 8.5 0 15.2 14.4 107 107 14.2 0 20 4.0 
08 Fruits 136 112 5.9 0 20.8 20.1 132 132 6.9 0 20 34.7 
09 Coffee, 
tea etc. 
50 50 2.3 0 12.5 68.2 48 48 1.8 0 20 79.0 
10 Cereals 62 7 5.4 0 12.8 6.7 57 57 8.3 0 20 11.5 
11 Milling 71 6 12.2 7.7 19.2 0.0 80 80 17.7 10 20 0.0 
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industry 
12 Oilseeds 74 71 1.2 0 8.3 73.1 73 73 4.9 0 20 48.2 
13 Lacs, 
gums etc. 
14 14 2.3 0 19.2 66.7 13 13 1.0 0 10 90.0 
14 Veg. 
plainting 
mat. 
5 5 0.0 0 0 100 5 5 2.0 2 2 0.0 
15 Fats and 
oils 
120 113 5.0 0 16 20.0 33 33 10.0 0 30 0.0 
16 Meat 
prep. 
38 19 15.0 10.2 15.4 0.0 45 45 15.0 10 20 0.0 
17 Sugars 
etc. 
44 3 11.4 8 13.4 0.0 47 47 17.5 5 50 0.0 
18 Cocoa 
and cocoa 
prep. 
27 7 6.1 0 9.6 18.2 29 29 4.5 0 15 45.5 
19 Prep of 
cereals 
51 2 10.7 8.5 12.8 0.0 51 51 11.9 0 20 5.3 
20 Prep. 
Veg. & fruits 
304 229 17.5 0 33.6 0.7 339 339 10.1 0 20 1.3 
21 Misc. ed. 
Preparations 
39 23 9.3 0 14.7 9.4 45 45 10.5 0 20 0.7 
22 Beverag-
es 
303 58 3.9 0 32 41.9 181 181 2.8 0 10 54.5 
23 Residues 
etc. 
63 28 0.0 0 0 100.0 65 65 15.0 0 20 100 
24 Tobacco 21 10 44.7 10 74.9 0.0 31 31 8.8 1 20 0.0 
Source: WTO 2012 Integrated Database notifications. Notes: a) TL = Tariff line; AV = ad valorem; b) next to ad 
valorem tariffs (in % of the export value), the EU has quite a number of specific tariffs in €/tonne (difference in TL 
in column 2 and 3), while Ukraine applies no specific tariffs (TL in column 8 is equal to TL in column 9). 
 
 Next to full tariff reduction up to zero the EU and Ukraine have offered each 
other a number of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) (See EU Ukraine AA, pp.261-268). 
These TRQ's refer to maximum annual volumes that can be imported duty-free. 
Major products under the EU TRQ offer are meat (beef: 12kt; pork: 40kt; poul-
try: 40kt),dairy products (milk powder: 5kt; butter 3kt), sugars (40kt) and cere-
als (common wheat: 1,000kt; maize: 650kt; barley:350kt). Ukraine on its turn 
has offered TRQs for imports into Ukraine from the EU on pork meat (20kt), 
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poultry (20kt) and sugars (20kt). Ukraine's offer is modest, where the EU allows 
a significant volume of Ukraine's cereals to come in duty-free. For the Dutch 
livestock sector, the latter may have favourable effects, as cheap imports of ce-
reals for animal fodder purposes may reduce their feed costs. EU's TRQs of-
fered to Ukraine on meat is not that significant as the EU27 imports 15 to 20m 
tonnes of meat on an annual basis (see Eurostat COMEXT data of recent years). 
However, Ukraine is presently exporting only very little meat to the Union. If 
Ukraine can comply with EU standards, the TRQs on meat may imply a signifi-
cant increase of meat exports from Ukraine to the EU, seen from the Ukraine 
perspective. For the EU market and seen from the Dutch meat sector perspec-
tive, expected inflow of Ukraine meat and therefore competition from Ukraine is 
minor. 
 
 
6.3 Dutch offensive interests 
 
A DCFTA with Ukraine would open up the Ukrainian market for Dutch exports. 
Ukraine's agricultural sector is protected against imports with generally low tar-
iffs: the overall simple average applied tariff rate is 11% while a simple average 
MFN applied tariff is 9.5% (WTO country website at wto.org, data 2010). In line 
with these averages Ukraine's applied tariffs on imports from the Netherlands 
(the EU) are relatively low too. For instance, average import tariffs on meat or 
ornamental plants - the two major Dutch export products to Ukraine - are around 
10% (ranging between 5 and 20%). Import tariffs on sugar and confectionery 
and on beverages are much higher than the averages mentioned, indicating that 
the elimination of tariffs as a consequence of the DCFTA may mostly affect 
these two product groups, while the Dutch current major export products to 
Ukraine may face only relatively small reductions of trade costs due to lower tar-
iffs. Dutch offensive interests in a DCFTA are most obvious in the commitment 
to apply EU trade-related rules included in the acquis communautaire and its re-
lated regulations and directives. The alignment of Ukrainian and EU standards 
will reduce trade costs between the two countries, which will provide incentives 
for the Dutch agribusiness across the board to export to Ukraine. 
 Interests in improved market access to Ukraine are particularly high for 
those Dutch agribusiness sectors who are traditionally export-oriented, such as 
the dairy sector, potato and a wide range of horticultural subsectors (vegeta-
bles, cut flowers, ornamental plants, etc). Next, input supplying companies from 
the Netherlands are also keen in exploring new export markets and, given the 
need for breeding stock, plant propagation material, greenhouses and livestock 
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stable interiors in accelerating Ukraine's agricultural development, reducing tar-
iffs and non-tariff barriers may contribute importantly to increased exports from 
the Netherlands to Ukraine in these areas. 
 Yet, the use of these opportunities will be highly dependent on Ukraine's re-
suming economic growth and the speed of institutional enhancements that are 
key for improving the current business environment in Ukraine. The signing of 
the DCFTA document by the EU and Ukraine is therefore pivotal as it will en-
courage Ukraine to undertake the necessary reforms. In addition, a DCFTA will 
convince those in the Dutch agribusiness interested in doing business in Ukraine 
that there is political support to enhancing the bilateral trade and investment re-
lations. A DCFTA provides the necessary level playing field to further explore the 
bilateral business opportunities. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
 
Ukraine's agricultural potential only used with policy reforms and institutional 
development 
The agricultural sector in Ukraine is generally credited with high potential, becom-
ing a 'breadbasket' for Europe and the world. This potential is largely based on its 
favourable natural conditions, most specifically the black soils that cover about 
half of the country's surface. Yet, presently the sector's main challenges are to 
enhance the sector's productivity and to increase value added and quality produc-
tion. To achieve results, improved access to financial resources, reform of its 
land market, and the further development of institutional services, such as credit 
information services, collateral registration, and market information services are 
strongly recommended in analyses on the sector's international competitiveness. 
Also, quality standards (for milk and for grain - these are agricultural commodities 
the country is expected to play a significant role at international markets) should 
be raised to EU or international benchmarks, in order to improve the industry's 
ability to process it. Quality can be improved, among others, with better aligning 
human capital with the sector needs. Specific interventions include, for example, 
human capacity building programs in the fields of veterinary medicine, feeding ef-
ficiency, animal husbandry skills and management. Ukraine is being supported by 
international organisations (like IFC, EBRD) and by activities supported via bilateral 
government-to-government programmes, among other by the Netherlands (see 
Appendix 3 for some examples). 
 Ukraine's agri-food sector development is strongly affected by the country's 
general economic situation. The global economic downturn in 2008/09 had a 
major impact in Ukraine. The agri-food sector is benefitting from the slowly re-
suming economic growth in the country (that has a positive effect on domestic 
food consumption) yet its main bottlenecks for increasing performance are not 
being tackled without reforms with regard to land markets, credit availability and 
agricultural policy support. Further agricultural development requires an institu-
tional infrastructure that enables business investments aimed at increasing effi-
ciency and quality improvements. 
 
A DCFTA with the EU will accelerate institutional improvements in Ukraine 
Different from joining the CU which does not require institutional reforms, 
Ukraine's institutional improvements will be accelerated by a DCFTA with the EU. 
Indeed, ratification of the DCFTA implies Ukraine accepts the DCFTA commit-
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ment to adopt the EU trade acquis, which entails the implementation and appli-
cation of EU norms, standards and practices through institution building. These 
applications are expected to result in increased efficiencies in Ukraine's agri-
food sector. The EU will have to remain engaged in the implementation process, 
as Ukraine's institutional capacity might be expected to be too low for a smooth 
implementation process. Here is where the Netherlands can provide assistance 
on a government-to-government basis. 
 Such assistance is beneficial not only to the recipient country, but also to 
the Dutch agribusiness companies interested to export and/or invest in the 
country. The DCFTA will allow improved market access to Ukraine for Dutch 
products, whether these are supplies (machinery, greenhouses etc), agricultural 
commodities or food products. Both trade and investment relations need a sta-
ble business environment, in which among others contract enforcement is as-
sured and business risks can be surveyed. The DCFTA is expected to improve 
the investment climate, making the agricultural sector also more attractive to 
domestic and foreign investors. 
 
Ample Dutch opportunities in Ukraine's agri-food sector 
Given the need for investments in order to increase efficiency and improve quali-
ty in Ukraine's agri-food supply chain the Dutch agribusiness has ample oppor-
tunities to benefit from the DCFTA either by exporting required inputs, 
commodities or food products, or by producing these locally. Typically, there is 
a need for up to date farm interior equipment, such as milking equipment, stor-
age and cooling facilities. In the animal sector there is strong demand for ex-
panding stocks with a genetic mark-up. Improvements in yields need 
investments in better quality of seeds, semen, animal feed, agricultural machin-
ery, etc. The Dutch potato and vegetable growing performances are highly rec-
ognised world-wide. These are typically sectors in which Dutch products and 
inputs, next to services such as management assistance, training, advice, and 
knowledge exchange can make an important contribution in helping the Ukraini-
an sector perform better. The Ukrainian agri-food supply chain needs technical, 
economic and management information in order to become more efficient and 
competitive, surely when markets become more saturated and competitors 
more aggressive. This offers many opportunities for the Dutch knowledge sys-
tem of education, extension and research, to offer its services to the (larger) 
companies and farms, and/or to the (regional) government(s). Whether these 
opportunities are used, will very much depend on the combination of resumed 
economic growth and an attractive business environment. Both the current eco-
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nomic situation and the business environment in Ukraine need improvements in 
order to foster Dutch companies to start and/or expand business in Ukraine. 
 
Ukraine a competitor at the EU market? 
Will Ukraine become a serious competitor for Dutch agribusiness on the EU 
market in case the DCFTA is ratified? This is highly unlikely. Ukraine is a major 
producer of the commodities wheat, barley and rapeseed and produces sun-
flower oil from sunflower seed. Ukraine exports cereals to the EU, and large 
volumes of rapeseed and sunflower oil to the Union. These are products that do 
not compete with Dutch interest in the EU market; conversely, the Dutch agri-
business (livestock, vegetable oil processors, bio-fuel sector) may benefit from 
increased supply from Ukraine of the above mentioned commodities. In this 
context the increase of Ukraine's tariff free quota to export to the EU as part of 
the DCFTA would be welcomed by Dutch livestock producers. Generally speak-
ing, the DCFTA is not expected to change the structure of Ukraine's exports to 
the EU significantly. Dutch exporters may face some more competition for dairy 
and meat products, so these product categories may also have some concerns 
about and defensive interests in the trade talks between the EU and Ukraine. 
Yet, for these products quality is an important attribute on which Dutch products 
should be expected to be able to stand competition from Ukrainian suppliers. 
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Appendix 1 
The DCFTA Guidelines 
 
 
Sadowski (2012) summarises the main principles of the DCFTA and provides 
some clarification for each of them in the following way: 
 
- lifting customs tariffs (import and export) on goods manufactured in the EU 
and Ukraine 
In the case of some goods, tariff reduction is to be carried out gradually within a 
timeframe of up to ten years. Ukraine has maintained the option to use protec-
tion mechanisms on certain conditions within fifteen years of the beginning of 
the agreement's implementation, including imposing export duty on certain 
goods or keeping higher import duty on selected goods (for example, cars). 
 
- removal of technical barriers to trade and import restrictions (with the ex-
ceptions admissible under the GATT rules) 
The EU has maintained quotas in the case of some agricultural and food prod-
ucts imported from Ukraine (for example, meat and dairy products), and Ukraine 
has done likewise for those imported from the EU (for example, pork, poultry 
and sugar). 
 
- Ukraine's adopting EU regulations, standards and laws in the area of trade 
The agreement includes a schedule for adopting individual EU regulations, in-
cluding those concerning sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, technical regu-
lations, customs procedures, investment law and the rules for operation of 
foreign companies, competition rules, state aid to business entities, principles 
which regulate the operation of some branches of the service sector, including 
financial services, telecommunication, maritime transport, postal services, etc. 
 
- introducing the same rules for trade between the EU and Ukraine as those 
existing between the EU member states 
These issues are to be regulated under the Agreement on Conformity Assess-
ment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA), which is to be attached to 
the DCFTA as an additional protocol. In the case of Ukraine, the ACAA is intend-
ed to cover selected branches of the industry (but not the entire economy), and 
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envisages the adjustment of Ukrainian technical and infrastructural regulations 
and standards to EU legislation. 
 
- equal conditions for doing business for business entities 
Each party is to ensure the freedom to do business for companies from the 
other party operating in its area on the same terms as enjoyed by its own com-
panies, and to refrain from discriminatory practices, with the exception of cer-
tain sectors (including mining, the arms industry, and maritime and air 
transport). This also concerns public procurement, where both parties are ex-
pected to treat business entities as their own, and Ukraine is supposed to grad-
ually adjust its regulations to those applicable in the EU. At the same time, 
Ukrainian regulations concerning the flow of capital and investments are to be 
liberalised. 
 
- protection of intellectual property rights and geographical indication 
The list of protected names of goods includes approximately 3000 products 
from the EU (for example, cognac and champagne) and approximately 100 from 
Ukraine. 
 
- dispute settlement procedures 
These should have a greater influence than before on the other party in cases 
where provisions of the agreement are breached, and also in cases when the 
rights of entrepreneurs operating on the other party's market are violated. This 
is a serious problem now, especially with regard to securing the rights of firms 
from EU member states operating on the Ukrainian market. 
 
- the energy sector 
The free trade agreement refers to a smaller extent to energy co-operation, the 
basis for which is the agreements concluded as part of Energy Community. The 
DCFTA is primarily focused on issues concerning trade in energy and raw ener-
gy materials (setting prices, customs duties, infrastructural co-operation, and 
the transit and transport of energy). It is assumed that Ukraine will liberalise its 
energy prices. The provision-setting guarantees for the secure transit of energy 
raw materials are vital for the EU. Ukraine has undertaken to improve its own 
gas transit regulations. However, the provision on safe transit will have limited 
consequences, since none of the parties is able to influence the actions taken 
by third parties - in this case Russia, which is the key supplier of the oil and gas 
which are transported to the EU through Ukraine. 
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- the dialogue instruments 
The agreement provides for the establishment of export committees and dia-
logue forums to handle individual areas of co-operation covered by the DCFTA. 
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Appendix 2 
Import tariffs and TRQ in EU-Ukraine bilateral agricultural 
trade relations 
 
 
Table 14 and Table 15 respectively provide an overview of the import tariffs im-
posed on EU27 exports to Ukraine and the ones imposed on Ukraine exports to 
the EU27. The tariffs are presented in terms of applied tariff rates for aggre-
gates of HS product groups (using the standard aggregation method of import 
weighting according to tariff line). With the applied tariff rates, the actual tariff 
protection is revealed. The latest information available (year 2009) is presented 
with the focus on those agri-food products that have been identified as being 
important for trade between the EU27 (more specifically the Netherlands) and 
Ukraine (compare Section 2.2.2), and for which data are available that indicate 
the use of tariff-free import quota. The latter information, showing how much 
imports is coming in under a TRQ regime, is provided by WITS-Trains, yet its 
most recent year of registration is 2009. 
 The Ukraine average applied import tariffs on EU27 exports of live plants, 
including flowers, and meat products are mainly between 5 and 10%, with the 
largest number of tariff lines affected (see Table 14). While Ukraine tariff protec-
tion seems limited, it is important to note that Ukraine has applied both export 
restrictions and export duties on grains and oil crops in case of critical shortage 
of food products in the country (for instance in 2011 and 2012). There have 
been regular discussions on abolishing these trade barriers at international mul-
tilateral level, but they may also be addressed in the foreseen EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA.1 
Overall, the EU grants preferential market access to Ukraine but the lower pref-
erential tariff rates are not always applied for agri-food products. For grains, the 
EU for example implements a system of tariff rate quota (TRQs), whereby the 
Ukrainian quota has generally been filled and thus, as described by the Europe-
                                                 
1 Note that the Ukraine government has been thinking on further export restrictions, in particular an 
export ban on wheat in order to keep prices in Ukraine under control, given the poor harvest and 
shortages of crops. Exports are expected to be limited to 5m tonnes for 2012; by November 2012 
4m tonnes have already been exported (FAO, 2012. Monthly News Report on Grains. MNR Issue 87 - 
October 2012 
(http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/COMM_MARKETS_MONITORING/Grains/Documents/M
NR_1210.pdf). 
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an Bank for Reconstruction and Development & FAO (2009), Ukraine is ex-
pected to ask for additional quota in the DCFTA negotiations. 
 As shown in Table 15, EU27 applied tariffs and preferential tariffs for cereals 
(HS10) and residues from food industries (HS23), in particular oil cake and oth-
er solid residues for animal feed, are rather low. For these products, about 90% 
of trade is free trade. Furthermore, oil seed exports (HS12) from Ukraine to the 
EU are also traded under the free trade condition. In contrast, meat products 
(HS2 and HS16) are not traded freely, but there are EU27 preferential tariffs. 
Tariff reductions would open-up the EU27 market for Ukraine, especially the 
EU27 meat market. In conclusion, meat can be considered to be a defensive in-
terest for the EU27 and the Netherlands. 
 
Table 14 Ukraine import tariffs on exports from the Netherlands, focus 
on relevant Dutch products (according to trade value and 
share), 2009 
Product group Import value 
affected in 
1000 USD 
Ad valorem tariff 
equivalent in % 
(simple average) 
Min Max Number of tariff 
lines affected 
HS2: Meat and edible 
meat offal 
25,726.2 11.1 10 15 30 
HS6: Live tree & other 
plant; bulb, root; cut 
flowers  
29,779.4 8.5 5 20 49 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013) and (WITS-TRAINS, 2013). 
 
  
 97 
Table 15 EU27 tariffs on exports from Ukraine, focus on relevant Dutch 
products (according to trade value and share), 2009 
Product group Import value 
affected in 
1000 USD 
Ad valorem tariff 
equivalent in % 
(simple average) 
Min Max Number 
of tariff 
lines af-
fected 
HS2: Meat and edible 
meat offal 
12.7 Applied tariff: 31.1 0 90.6 21 
12.2 Preferential tariff: 2.9 0 15.4 65 
0 Free imports    
HS16: Prep of meat, 
fish or crustaceans, 
molluscs etc 
18.5 Applied tariff: 19.4 16.
9 
33.3 4 
18.5 Preferential tariff: 9.4 0 21.5 28 
0 Free imports    
HS23: Residues from 
food industries, 
animal feed 
14,513.1 Applied tariff: 11.36 0 151.2 63 
2,707.1 Preferential tariff: 0.94 0 4.2 6 
124,845.4 Free imports    
2306: Oil- cake and 
other solid residues, 
whether or not 
116.95 Applied tariff: 2.32 0 46.5 8 
109,247.6 Free imports    
HS10: Cereals 1,139,521 Applied tariff: 14.1 0 48.2 62 
56.9 Free imports    
HS11: milling industry 3,333.2 Applied tariff: 38.5 3.6 68.9 38 
3,333.2 Preferential tariff: 8.6 4.2 15.7 6 
0 Free imports    
HS12: Oil seeds, 
misc. grains 
4,593.8 Applied tariff: 0.25 0 4.8 49 
8,138.4 Preferential tariff: 0.83 0 4.8 6 
1,271,157.4 Free imports    
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE, 2013) and (WITS-TRAINS, 2013). 
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Appendix 3 
Addressing business opportunities in Ukraine 
 
 
Table 16 Examples of current initiatives towards addressing business 
opportunities in Ukraine 
Issues 
addressed 
Description Level  Foreign 
countries 
involved 
Reference  
Food safety The Ukrainian Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment and Trade developed a draft law On 
Standardisation. HACCP quality control system 
will be introduced at all domestic enterprises. 
Policy, mul-
tiple sec-
tors 
 RBC-Ukraine 
(2012); 
ICP (2012c) 
Various companies work towards being 
HACCP certified. For example, the Frozen 
Group in Ukraine believes that retail networks 
will eventually refuse cooperating with non-
certified companies.  
Company  UCCA 
(2012) 
The Swiss Research Institute of Organic Agri-
culture (FiBL) will facilitate the integration of 
Ukrainian small and medium-sized enterprises 
into international trade through certified organ-
ic produce (until 2016).  
Organic 
farming 
sector 
Switzer-
land 
Eisenring 
(2012) 
Market in-
frastructure  
The State actively supports service coopera-
tives in rural areas and is willing to allocate 
UAH 100m to support service cooperatives. 
The Government provides, for example, subsi-
dies for young cattle. It is planned to create 
1,500 agricultural service cooperatives. 
Policy, 
Dairy 
sector 
 ICP (2012c) 
The number of investment projects increases 
due to the Memorandum of Cooperation be-
tween the Government and Business Commu-
nity of Ukraine. It is planned to construct and 
renovate 91 agri-industrial facilities total 
UAH470m in Sumy oblast. 
Sumy 
region, 
Policy and 
Business 
 ICP (2012b) 
Cold storage capacity in various places by 
Dutch business (for fruits and vegetables, 
Kiev region, 
Kharkov 
The Neth-
erlands 
Agentschap
NL (2012b) 
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dairy and meat products). region 
Productivity 
and effi-
ciency 
The Danish project 2010-2013 'Providing Ser-
vices to Manage Two Value-Added Chains of 
Agricultural Products in Ukraine' (Agro-Lviv) 
aims at increasing the productivity and profit-
ability in the agricultural and processing sec-
tors (milk, fruit and vegetables)  
Lviv region Denmark ICP (2012a) 
The International Financial Corporation is ex-
pecting the new investments into the devel-
opment of large scale milk production sector. 
IFC finances several projects of large agricul-
tural operators 
Agrohold-
ings/ Busi-
ness 
 Various, e.g. 
IFC (2012) 
For big and financially healthy market players 
in Ukraine the Dutch insurance company Atra-
dius offers possibilities to get investment flows 
from the Netherlands. Exposure under the for-
eign investment insurance scheme totalled 
€195m at the end of 2011, of which €59m 
are for Ukraine. 
Agrohold-
ings 
The Neth-
erlands 
Atradius 
(2011) 
Dutch farmers successfully operate in Ukraine. 
The UA Minister of agrarian policy and food, 
Mr. Prisyazhnyuk announced that there is a 
wish to have five Dutch farmers operating in 
each of the 24 regions in Ukraine  
Farms  The Neth-
erlands 
Rozendal 
(2012) 
The Ukrainian government offers 50% cost 
compensation for greenhouse construction if 
modern energy-saving technologies are intro-
duced.  
Greenhous
e sector 
 UCAB 
(2012c) 
Knowledge 
gaps and 
trainings 
AgriSchool project has been started by the 
Association 'Ukrainian Agribusiness Club'. 
Modular trainings of AgriSchool consist of: 
Soils, Seeding, Plant and Soil Protection, Field 
Mechanisation, Post-Harvesting, Management 
and Finance in agri-business, and Field Trip 
(Ukraine and Europe). 
Various, but 
mainly crop 
sector 
Germany, 
The Neth-
erlands 
UCAB 
(2012a) 
Project 'Plus for Progress in Ukraine (2012-
2014) on precision farming techniques along 
the complete production chain offers various 
Crop 
sector 
The Neth-
erlands 
Agentschap
NL (2012b); 
PlusForPro-
 100 
trainings in Ukraine and in the Netherlands.  gres (2012) 
Energy of the Future programme 2012 is one 
of the projects under the umbrella of the Fac-
tory-of-the-Future concept, promoted by the 
Saxion University of Applied Sciences. Ex-
change of students and professionals. 
Energy The Neth-
erlands 
Popovych 
(2012) 
 
Within the Netherlands Sustainable Biomass 
Program, Dutch experts provide trainings on 
Sustainability Certification and NTA8080 certif-
icate (bio-mass).  
Agro-sector The Neth-
erlands 
Agentschap
NL (2012a) 
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